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An Information Prescription for Drug
Regulation
ANITA BERNSTEINt & JOSEPH BERNSTEINtt
INTRODUCTION
When "safe and effective" joined the Food Drug
Cosmetic Act as a criterion for the sale of new prescription
drugs in 1962,1 the statute empowered the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to withhold every new
pharmaceutical product from the market until its seller, in
its application for FDA approval, demonstrated favorable
future conditions. Sellers since 1962 have had to show that
their new drug will not poison people who take it into their
bodies, 2 and that they will deliver on the promise in its
label. 3 Whenever this applicant-seller cannot demonstrate
safety and effectiveness, the FDA cannot approve its drug.
Without FDA approval, a drug cannot be sold in interstate
commerce.
Through this statutory language, lack of safety and lack
of effectiveness became the genre of adversity that
pharmaceutical regulation, as a species of regulation in
general, anticipates and strives to control. Draft rules
t Sam Nunn Professor of Law, Emory University; Wallace Stevens Professor of
Law, New York Law School.
tt Clinical- Associate Professor of Orthopedic Surgery, University of
Pennsylvania School of Medicine; Senior Fellow, Leonard Davis Institute of
Health Economics; Attending Surgeon, Philadelphia Veterans Hospital.
1. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 et. seq. (2000)).
2. This paraphrase of "safe" is controversial, as we discuss below, passim.
3. One drug-law scholar uses legislative history to demonstrate that the
meaning of "effective" is what Congress intended, and that Congress rejected
efficacious, or bearing the quality of "efficacy," which refers to clinical
improvement. Jennifer Kulynych, Will FDA Relinquish the "Gold Standard" for
New Drug Approval? Redefining "Substantial Evidence" in the FDA
Modernization Act of 1997, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 127, 129, 132-34 (1999).
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published daily in the Federal Register aim to reduce
polluted air, choking-hazard toys, dirty groundwater,
hazardous materials, toxic pesticides, invidious
discrimination, undisclosed risks in securities offerings,
eighteen hour workdays, and other dangers in the parade of
regulated-against horribles. Lack of safety and lack of
effectiveness are the relevant horribles here. Like other
regulated sectors, this industry must exert itself to reduce
the adversities that its business is wont to create.
Does "safe and effective" mean something beyond the
usual regulatory reference to externalities? "Safe" does not
equal "incapable of doing harm": all drugs do harm.4 On the
question of what the word safe does mean, the amended
Food Drug Cosmetic Act makes what we argue was the only
possible choice: in Section 505, where a definition would go,
Congress demurred on defining. To borrow a riff of about
the same age as the drug amendments, regulators evidently
will know safety when they see it.5 "Effective," though not
exactly defined in the 1962 update that introduced the
requirement of demonstrated effectiveness, comes with a bit
more content: Congress took pains to require "substantial
evidence" of effectiveness before the FDA may approve a
new drug,6  and has elaborated on what constitutes
substantial evidence. 7  In rejecting a near-synonym,
"efficacy," Congress apparently also declined to require that
4. "All substances are poisons; there is none which is not a poison. The right
dose differentiates a poison .... " CASARETT & DOULL's TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC
SCIENCE OF POISONS 4 (Curtis D. Klaassen et al. eds., 5th ed. 1996).
5. Justice Potter Stewart, on obscenity: "I shall not today attempt further to
define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand
description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I
know it when I see it .. " Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
6. For most drugs the FDA requires findings in two controlled studies that
the drug outperforms a placebo in causing the human clinical changes that its
maker promises to achieve. Under rare circumstances, one controlled study will
suffice. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2000) ("If the Secretary determines, based on
relevant science, that data from one adequate and well-controlled clinical
investigation and confirmatory evidence (obtained prior to or after such
investigation) are sufficient to establish effectiveness, the Secretary may
consider such data and evidence to constitute substantial evidence for purposes
of the preceding sentence.").
7. "Effective" creates a regulatory expectation of other evidence, such as
animal-studies results, to demonstrate the capacity of a drug. Further detail on
what effectiveness demands is codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
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a drug cause clinical improvement in a patient's condition.
"Effective," as was mentioned, refers to the obligation to
deliver on the promises of a label.
The adjectives hold a distinct linguistic status that
affects their function in statutory and regulatory law.
Because safe and effective are both what linguists call
gradable adjectives, a speaker of English can add an adverb
and say "very effective" or "more safe."'8 Better suited to
binary yes-no regulation are absolute adjectives, including
minimum-standard adjectives ("wet" or "impure") and
maximum-standard adjectives ("dry" or "pure"). Even more
suited to binary regulation among the absolute adjectives
are noncomparatives like "wooden" and "locked."9 Being
able to say "very" (or "partially," "insufficiently,"
"unambiguously," and so on) "safe" or "effective" in a
language where the phrase "very handmade" would be
absurd suggests the need for flexibility, nuance, and context
in fulfilling the mandate of Section 505 of the Food Drug
Cosmetic Act. Exploring this flexible mandate, while
hewing as closely as possible to "safe and effective," we
claim in this Essay that prescription drugs are different
from other commodities and activities subject to federal
regulation. We identify five overlapping aspects of this
difference.
First, this industry is virtually unique in its pursuit of
the same thing that its overseeing agency demands.
Regulation in other sectors points at the dark underbelly of
a business. You think you produce coal; regulators say you
produce acid rain. You're trying to sell stock; regulators
worry you are unloading hidden risks to investors. Your
punch press on the shop floor creates finished goods-and
amputations. In the prescription drugs business, however,
8. See Christopher Kennedy, Vagueness and Grammar: The Semantics of
Relative and Absolute Gradable Predicates, June 25, 2005,
http://www.semanticsarchive.net (last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
9. Id. For examples of absolute non-comparative adjectives in the Code of
Federal Regulations, see 9 C.F.R. § 114.6 (2006) ("Each biological product, when
in liquid form, shall be mixed thoroughly in a single container.") (emphasis
added); 49 C.F.R. § 40.131 (2005) ("When, as the MRO [medical review officer],
you receive a confirmed positive, adulterated, substituted, or invalid test result
from the laboratory, you must contact the employee directly (i.e., actually talk
to the employee), on a confidential basis, to determine whether the employee
wants to discuss the test result.") (emphasis added).
5712006]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
regulators and regulated claim to seek safe and effective
drugs, at least in their rhetoric. In this Essay, we recognize
that the industry's many critics might retort that what the
industry wants is no more than profit. 10 To sidestep a
needless quarrel, here we comment only on the reputation
the industry seeks rather than try to establish sincerity."
For those who seek to market prescription drugs, a "safe
and effective" product, or perhaps "public health," is both
the regulatory mission they must obey and the ostensible
good they try to sell. By contrast, resource extractors like
mining businesses seldom claim to pursue pollution
reduction as a chief goal. Securities underwriters do not say
they make a living selling disclosure.
The closely related second point is that in this sector,
too much regulatory suppression leads to the same ill
effects as too little. Safety concerns, for example, can be
defeated by both overregulation and underregulation:
approving a risky drug harms patients who use it and
suffer its side effects; declining to approve a risky drug will
keep it from patients who would benefit from what the drug
could do to fight their condition. The effectiveness criterion
also can make paired-set errors. On the underregulation
side of the ledger, patients can die from having spent time
and energy on a useless nostrum; 12 on the overregulation
side, a drug that would be helpful to a number of patients
can flunk controlled studies and never reach those needy
10. At one of the workshop presentations of this Essay, a participant argued
that the drug industry would "sell water" if it could. For book-length criticism of
this sector published in one year alone, see JOHN ABRAMSON, OVERDO$ED
AMERICA: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (2004); MARCIA ANGELL,
THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO
Do ABOUT IT (2004); JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS,
AND COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (2004); MERRILL GOOZNER, THE $800 MILLION
PILL: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE COST OF NEW DRUGS (2004).
11. For examples of pharmaceutical-company public statements claiming a
stake in public health, see http://www.pfizerpublichealth.com (last visited Aug.
8, 2006); Schering-Plough, Who We Are, http'/www.scherng-plough.com/scheringplougl
aboutlabout.jsp (stating that "we aspire to earn the trust of doctors, patients and
customers by providing a steady flow of innovative, science-based medicines and
services that improve the health and well-being of people around the world.")
(last visited Aug. 8, 2006).
12. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 556-58 (1979) (refusing to
allow an exception to the effectiveness requirement for terminal patients for
this reason).
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consumers. 13 Here drugs present another contrast to most
industries, where too much regulation will cause ill effects
that are different from, rather than similar to, the ill effects
of too little regulation.
Third, whereas regulation in other industries seeks to
minimize harmful effects, regulation of prescription drugs
has a subtler task: to achieve balance between safety (that
is, relatively few harmful effects) and effectiveness
(understood as enough clinical potency to deliver on the
manufacturer's promise). The adjective "safe" in the Food
Drug Cosmetic Act can be understood only in a context of
potential benefits. 14 Regulators tolerate grim side effects in
a lifesaving drug that would be fatal to the approval of a
drug with superficial and cosmetic effects, or for yet another
beta blocker.
In other words, drug regulation seeks to maximize
utility to consumers, rather than protect them from discrete
dangers in the mode of ordinary regulation-and utility is
in a sense the sum of safety and effectiveness. 15 A strong
13. Effectiveness is the more controversial of the two criteria. Daniel B.
Klein and Alexander Tabarrok, for example, post critical writings on their
website, FDA Review. See http://www.fdareview.org (last visited Feb. 18, 2006).
Relying on work by Sam Peltzman and Steven Wiggins, Klein and Tabarrok
argue that the effectiveness criterion has kept valuable therapies off the market
and thereby caused "tens of thousands of excess deaths." See Daniel B. Klein &
Alexander Tabarrok, Who Certifies Off-Label?, REGULATION MAGAZINE, Summer
2004, at 60, 63 [hereinafter Klein & Tabarrok, Who Certifies].
14. The director of the FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
made this point in a 1999 interview:
If I say to you, 'you have a 1 in 100 chance of dying from this drug, but
it will do wonderful things for you,' that might mean something totally
different to you than it would to me. So we need to bring patients, as
well as those who treat patients, in much more and ask them, 'What is
an acceptable risk?'
Tamar Nordenberg, When Is a Medical Product Too Risky?, FDA CONSUMER,
Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 8, 11, available at http://www.fda.gov/fdacl
features/1999/599_med.html [hereinafter Woodcock Interview].
15. Effectiveness might be understood to include cost-effectiveness. For a
summary of drug utility that implicitly includes this value, written to help
guide third-party payors, see Format for Formulary Submissions-A Brief
Description, available at http://www.fmcpnet.org [hereinafter Format for
Formulary Submissions]:
The Format is a set of guidelines, a template that drug companies can
use to prepare submissions of new and existing pharmaceuticals for a
health system's Pharmacy and Therapeutics (P & T) Committee.
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showing in one encourages drug regulators to tolerate a
weaker showing in the other. For example, federal
regulatory law allows animal studies alone to suffice
preliminarily for a finding of effectiveness when a new drug
is "intended to treat life-threatening and severely
debilitating illnesses" to which "no satisfactory alternative
therapy exists," or offers a therapy for which human
efficacy studies are not ethical or feasible. 16  The
aforementioned grim side effects (that is, lack of safety) are
a price worth paying only for a drug that can do much good
(or, in other words, is extremely effective). A feeble drug-
one that is not too effective-warrants approval only when
it is extraordinarily safe.
A fourth difference between prescription-drug
regulation and other regulation lies in its distinct and
separate target audiences. To be sure, most regulation
strives to protect more than one cohort. Environmental
rules governing asbestos removal, for example, might have
in mind abatement workers, people located inside buildings,
and real estate holders, among other sectors. But
divergences are much sharper in the industry we address
here. Who are its consumers? When the last comprehensive
amendments to the Food Drug Cosmetic Act were enacted
in 1962, the answer was simple: physicians. Manufacturers
did not market prescription drugs to patients then, 17 and
Manufacturers who follow these guidelines generate a standardized set
of clinical and economic evidence, providing health systems with a
broad and more accurate analysis of a drug's impact on a patient. As a
result, health plans can more confidently answer the question: 'Which
drugs offer the greatest opportunity to improve patient health at
reasonable costs, thus providing good value?' Previously, P & T
Committees often received drug information passively from
pharmaceutical manufacturers that was biased and of poor quality. In
this era of dramatically increased drug costs, biotechnology, and
information availability, the Format empowers health systems to pro-
actively request specific information from manufactures that will allow
them to more accurately determine the total value that a drug brings
to their population as the basis for accepting or rejecting a drug for its
formulary.
16. 21 C.F.R. 312.80 (2006) (referring to 'life-threatening and severely
debilitating illnesses"); 21 C.F.R. 314.610 (2006) (referring to ethics and
feasibility).
17. See Wayne L. Pines, A History and Perspective on Direct-to-Consumer
Promotion, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 489 (1999). In hindsight, there were
harbingers of direct-to-consumer advertising even in the 1960s, including the
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third-party entity payors-employers, insurance companies
and other managed-care organizations, and governments-
were barely present in this pre-Medicare and -Medicaid era.
Today, commentators who speak about drug consumers
typically have patients in mind, as in "direct-to-consumer
advertising,"'1 and patients are indeed central to the group
of drug consumers. 19 But physicians still account for the
lion's share of prescription drug advertising and promotion
budgets. 20 Third-party payors have also become a large
sector in their own right: today the question of which
prescription drug to buy can be overtly a business or a
public-policy decision as well as one for a learned
practitioner to make, and many entities have emerged as
decision-makers. 2' Brought together as "consumers," these
three groups-patients, physicians, and entities-vary from
the relatively unchanging, unitary publics that other
regulated industries serve.
Fifth and finally, the forward-looking approach with
which we began this Essay needs reexamination: regulation
must include more hindsight. The more static mode of
regulation in other sectors features rule-writing that
patient packet insert, first mandated for asthma inhalers and later made more
famous as an accompaniment to the sale of birth control pills. Id. at 490. But a
common divider between present permissive conditions and the ban on direct-
to-consumer marketing of the past is Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), where the
Supreme Court struck down a state law that prohibited pharmacists from
advertising prescription drug prices to the public.
18. 21 C.F.R. 312.80 (2006) (referring to "life-threatening and severely
debilitating illnesses"); 21 C.F.R. 314.610 (2006) (referring to ethics and
feasibility).
19. See infra Parts I.C. & II.B. (asking "What is it like to consume this
drug?").
20. For a good pie-chart breakdown, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO REP. No. 03-177, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: FDA OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-
CONSUMER ADVERTISING HAS LIMITATIONS 11 (2002).
21. For example, the chief pharmacist of General Motors announced in June
2006 that if all 250,000 persons with GM-supplied drug coverage switched from
a patented cholesterol-lowering drug to a generic, the company's "annual bill for
the treatment would fall by as much as 59 percent, to $82 million." GM's Health
Plans Try to Save by Going Generic Route, CHI. TRIB., Jun. 29, 2006, § 3
(Business), at 6. On governments as drug-buying decision-makers, see Sheryl
Gay Stolberg, House Rejects Coverage of Impotence Pills, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 25,
2005, at A10 (reporting decision by the federal government not to allow states to
use Medicaid funds to pay for erectile-dysfunction drugs for sex offenders).
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mainly addresses the future. Experience matters here and
there. For example, when the federal government began to
issue motor-vehicle safety standards in the late 1960s,
nobody foresaw the rise of feasible passive-restraint
technology. After it emerged, however, rules needed
revision, and today the car you drive likely contains a pair
of mandatory airbags. With any prescription drug,
experience matters much more, because utility to
consumers can exist only in consumer experience.
Accordingly, in this Essay we endorse a significant increase
in post-marketing regulatory attention.
At the same time, we do not endorse an increase in the
net number of rules; our ideal regulatory regime would
contain fewer rules. This Essay is written in the spirit of
"the new regulation" or "market-based regulation," an
academic literature that has occupied other fields of law
(especially environmental law and policy) but has curiously
said nothing about prescription drugs.22 In commending
"more attention" while disdaining "more rules," we focus on
information.
Information lies at the heart of the five differences
between other types of regulation and the regulation of
prescription drugs. What these five aspects-one, that
regulators and regulated pursue the same goals, at least
ostensibly; two, the danger of too much as too little
regulatory control; three, the pursuit of two goods, safety
and effectiveness, that often trade off against each other;
four, multiple constituencies affected by regulation; and
five, the importance of experience to guide future
constraints-have in common is that successful outcomes do
not emerge in a binary pattern. Trying only to suppress ills
is futile where all relevant substances are poisons. For this
industry, the indispensable aid to decision-making is
information, not only for technical experts in government,
but for buyers and sellers in the market. Information that
22. For samples of "the new regulation," now more of a venerable fixture
than an upstart (except in this prescription drugs context), see generally IAN
AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1995). See also Robert W. Hahn & Roberts W. Stavins,
Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 8-10 (1991); Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government
Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389 (2003); Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of
Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21 (2001).
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consumers-patients, physicians, and entities-can readily
obtain enhances their consumption choices. Because
prescription drugs are "safe and effective" only to the extent
they enhance consumer utility, information helps to fulfill
the statutory mandate of what drug regulation must seek.
I. THE PURSUIT OF INFORMATION: QUESTIONS THAT REVISED
REGULATION CAN HELP ANSWER
When regulators proclaim a new drug "safe and
effective" following the detailed demands of a 1962
mandate, they deliver only a partial answer to an
overarching preoccupation, "What is the value of this drug?"
"Value" starts with information about the safety and the
effectiveness of drugs. Today, consumers rightly emphasize
these two aspects of performance and focus on safety.
However, analysis from the consumer's vantage point
moves to another question about context: Would an
alternative treatment (or no treatment at all) provide equal
or more utility? Patients in particular add a query about the
personal, semi-subjective encounter they can expect from
any new pill, cream, injection, inhaler, or topical
application: What would it be like to consume this drug?
These questions, all central to the regulatory mission,
would receive better answers from new rules to yield
information after marketing.
A. How Safe Is This Drug?
Keeping in mind the vantage point of our consumers-
the patients, physicians, and entities that choose drugs-we
note that drug consumers care a great deal about
effectiveness, but regard the question of safety as
primary.23  The most basic worry about any new
pharmaceutical substance is that it will prove poisonous,
causing sickness rather than health. Following the premise
that without regulatory assurances of safety, consumers
will be poisoned, federal law has since 1938 compelled each
manufacturer to satisfy that its drug is safe before
23. At the end of this Essay we will note that of these three groups, entities
(or third-party payors) privilege effectiveness the highest. See infra Conclusion.
Yet even this group takes a keen interest in safety, and its interest in
effectiveness is not absolute. See infra note 56.
2006] 577
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marketing; only decades later was the Food Drug Cosmetic
Act amended to demand effectiveness as well. Effectiveness
is the more leisurely criterion, crucial but seldom urgent: an
ineffective drug will inflict harm only when it precludes or
interferes with an alternative course of action that offers
more utility, and is otherwise benign. Accordingly, we
postpone consideration of effectiveness, the lesser worry in
this consumer-focused analysis, to the next section, which
looks at effectiveness from the consumer vantage point by
comparing drugs to their alternatives. 24
Investigation into safety undertaken in pursuit of FDA
approval begins with the introduction of a new drug into
human bodies pursuant to a study that typically involves
fewer than one hundred human subjects. This "phase 1"
looks for side effects. Subsequent larger studies expose
more subjects to the drug; this scrutiny, focused on
effectiveness, also remains attentive to safety. Once they
win approval, manufacturers must report serious and
unexpected adverse effects promptly,25 and the FDA also
collects reports of "nonserious" adverse effects. 26 This
scheme of relatively stringent pre-approval scrutiny
followed by relatively lax scrutiny after marketing has
begotten three recurring categories of safety trouble,
discussed below, and a central question about effectiveness.
1. Hidden Harmful Side Effects. Consider phen-fen,
the combination of weight loss drugs phentermine and
fenfluramine, as an example of a drug that proved after
marketing to have hidden harmful side effects that were
severe enough to have stopped approval if known at the
outset. In initial studies, phen-fen researchers followed a
"crossover" design, placing individual subjects on and off
the medication during the study. They observed weight loss
while the medicine was being used and a rebound in weight
during the placebo period. This crossover methodology
enabled researchers to demonstrate effectiveness with
relatively few subjects. This small size might explain why
pulmonary complications did not emerge before approval.
24. We mean to say that other ways to look at effectiveness that are valid or
necessary in other contexts (e.g. clinical improvement, placebo comparisons) can
be more distracting than helpful in this context of consumer regulation.
25. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.305, 314.80 (2004).
26. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c)(2) (2004).
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Regulators approved phen-fen on the basis of these
elegant pilot studies, which proved effectiveness and did not
reveal a lack of safety. Large-scale experience after
approval confirmed that the combination of phen and fen
succeeded at suppressing appetites. But after the drug
combination entered widespread use-"off label," because
its seller, Wyeth, never received approval to market the two
substances as a single treatment 27-- clinicians learned that
it not only suppressed appetites but also caused primary
pulmonary hypertension in a small but measurable
percentage of users.28 Thousands of injured patients joined
a class action that won a $3.75 billion national settlement;
others brought separate actions against Wyeth. 29
Phen-fen illustrates the problem of hidden harmful side
effects but does not convey enough of its magnitude. The
danger here emerged relatively soon, before deaths
mounted. Moreover, the phen-fen complication was so rare
that even a small increase became obvious without
dedicated search. Such obviousness would not be manifest if
the complication were more common but no less noxious-
for example, sudden death from a cardiac arrhythmia. A
cluster of cases of primary pulmonary hypertension serves
as a sentinel and initiates an investigation, but a heart
attack in a patient with known risk factors, such as the
obesity that typically accompanies weight-loss drugs like
phen-fen, is a dog-bites-man story. Thus, a doctor whose
27. Susan Kelleher, Suddenly Sick: Rush Toward New Drugs Tramples
Patients' Health, SEATTLE TIMES, June 27, 2005, at Al. "Off-label" refers to uses
of a prescription drug to achieve ends that are not indicated on its package
inserts. The FDA approves each drug for a particular purpose, and requires the
manufacturer to provide package inserts, or labeling, consistent with this
approved usage. Physicians, however, may choose to prescribe the drug for
other uses. Viagra, for example, was starting out as an angina drug when
patients reported a sexual side effect. After being approved for erectile
dysfunction, it showed good results for pulmonary hypertension and helping
premature babies breathe. The label on thalidomide says leprosy, but this drug
is used mainly to treat cancer and AIDS. See Klein & Tabarrok, Who Certifies,
supra note 13, at 60.
28. Primary pulmonary hypertension is a disorder of the lung in which the
pressure in the pulmonary artery rises for unknown reasons, causing right
sided heart failure. See PULMONARY HYPERTENSION ASSOCIATION, PULMONARY
HYPERTENSION: HELPFUL INFORMATION FOR PATIENTS AND FAMILIES (2002),
available at http://www.phassociation.org/Learn/Understanding-PH-broc.pdf.
29. Mary P. Gallagher, Court Allows Threshold Challenge to Medical Basis
of Phen-Fen Opt-Outs, N.J. L.J., Apr. 19, 2004.
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patients had slightly more heart attacks would not even
notice it. She would likely attribute the increase to chance
or a factor other than prescription medication. Drug-
induced harm can accrete for years without provoking the
concern that phen-fen quickly presented.
2. Subtle but Real Increases in Common Problems. In
a clinical trial, researchers report adverse effects as a
listing of these effects observed, the rate of their
appearance among those taking the drug, and the rate
found among those taking an inert compound, or placebo. 30
The placebo contrast is crucial because certain reported
adverse effects are more difficult to interpret, especially
those that are ubiquitous. Almost everyone will claim a
headache now and then; how can one tell whether to blame
drugs? The clinical question is not whether adverse effects
are found in the study group, but whether their rate of
appearance is meaningfully different than that of the
placebo group.31 This question in turn requires detailed
statistical analysis. 32
The larger the sample group, the more representative
an observed parameter is likely to be: statisticians speak of
"the law of large numbers. ' 33 Because a study population is
only a small subset of the population of ultimate users, the
study may lack statistical power to discern differences in
30. The Code of Federal Regulations regards these protocols as central to an
"adequate and well-controlled study." See 31 C.F.R. § 321.126 (2004).
31. See Woodcock Interview, supra note 14 (explaining this precept as
followed at the FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research).
32. If an adverse effect is found in 6% of a study group and in 3% of a
placebo group, one still may not be sure that the drug increases the rate of the
effect. Clearly, 6% is more than 3%---double, obviously. But 6% (and 3%) are not
the true rates-what would be found if one studied the drug in everybody
whoever will take it-but rather the observed rate in a population sample. The
true rate, namely what would be found among all users, not just of those in the
study group, may be different. Statistical tests can tell whether the observed
rate is a valid representative and thus whether a difference is genuine or rather
an artifact of random variation.
33. See generally Stan Lipovetsky, Probability, Statistics, and Stochastic
Processes, 48 TECHNOMETRICS 150 (2006) (book review) (placing "the law of large
numbers" in its context within a statistics reference work). Consistent with the
law of large numbers, a baseball player needs 502 plate appearances to qualify
for a seasonal batting title. Four hits in ten at-bats yields a batting average of
.400, but a player who attains that record over a season is hardly a ".400 hitter"
in the league of, say, Ted Williams.
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the rates of common adverse effects. The "power analysis"
that biostatisticians undertake at the outset of a study to
determine the minimum number of subjects is typically
focused on the therapeutic effect and will obscure small
differences in levels of common side effects.34 Thus, subtle
but real increases in the risk of common effects-those seen
in the baseline normal population-may be discarded as not
statistically significant. The truth might emerge only from
large-number post-marketing data.
Suppose five out of one hundred people taking a placebo
reported headaches, while ten out of another hundred
taking a real medicine reported them. Researchers would
have to confront two possibilities before drawing
conclusions: first, that the rate of headaches among the
real-medicine takers was genuinely higher (if perhaps not
literally double); and second, that the additional five cases
amounted to statistical noise. A study of a thousand
subjects might be needed to discern a true difference; the
truth might emerge only from large-number, post-
marketing data. A real-world illustration of this problem
comes from Vioxx, the popular painkiller that arthritis
patients lost following findings that it more than doubled
the risk of heart attack and stroke. 35 Until enough study
subjects took Vioxx, researchers could not attribute the
increase in cardiovascular complications to the drug.
3. Harmful-Effect Information Not Adequately Shared.
For this category of danger, the June 2005 withdrawal of
the drug Propulsid, used to treat excess gastric acid,
provides an illustration. Propulsid, a substance approved as
safe, proved deadly in use; it interfered with the heart's
electrical system, strongly enough to induce heart
34. A power analysis seeks the minimum number of subjects to establish
effectiveness: because studies are expensive, researchers seek to use as few
human beings as will yield valid conclusions. See Power and Precision, What is
Power Analysis?, http://www.power-analysis.com/power analysis.htm (providing
an overview of power analysis as determined by proprietary software). While
serving as chief counsel to the FDA in the 1970s, drug-law scholar Richard
Merrill identified the problem of too-small samples as a barrier to meaningful
safety research. Richard A. Merrill, Risk-Benefit Decisionmaking by the Food
and Drug Administration, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 994, 1005 n.59 (1977).
35. Drug Industry Weathers Horrid Year and Outlook Appears Rocky, FOOD
& DRUG L. WKLY., Business Update, Jan. 14, 2005.
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arrhythmia and death.36 For years, officials knew the drug
was dangerous. Its manufacturer, Johnson & Johnson, had
been hearing from the FDA about the dangers of the drug
beginning in January 1995, when officials "told Johnson &
Johnson that the drug was causing life-threatening
arrhythmias. ' '37 The agency expressed its concerns privately
to the manufacturer over the course of a decade. During
this time, Johnson & Johnson continued to market
Propulsid at great profit; harmful side effects continued
even after the company paid $90 million in 2004 to settle
claims alleging that Propulsid was responsible for three
hundred deaths and sixteen thousand nonfatal injuries.3 8
Like the other two recurring safety problems just
mentioned, harmful-effects data is a problem of missing
information.
B. Would an Alternative Treatment (or No Treatment at All)
Provide Equal or More Utility?
One prominent physician-pharmacologist, Jerry Avorn,
has said he would like to see "the following revenue-
crippling government evaluation" on most new drugs: "This
new medication has not been shown to be any better than
currently available products, and has a much more limited
safety record. There is no evidence that its higher price is
accompanied by any demonstrated therapeutic
advantage."39
Avorn wrote in a wry spirit rather than to propose
regulatory reform, but his suggestion would offer benefit to
consumers. If the content of this hypothetical evaluation
happens to be true about a particular drug, safety-and-
effectiveness (or their sum, utility) becomes stronger after
consumers gain access to this truth: many would avoid the
drug in favor of a better alternative. For the minority of
consumers who would do well with this new alternative,
information again becomes the key to utility. In the post-
36. See Gardiner Harris & Eric Koli, Lucrative Drug, Danger Signals and
the F.D.A., N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2005, at Al.
37. Id. at C6.
38. Id.
39. AVORN, supra note 10, at 365. Avorn has called this suggestion wishful
thinking. Id.
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1962 world, where most high-revenue drugs are members of
categories and cost-containment pressures have grown
strong, it is now impossible to think of utility without
comparing each drug to other treatments, and to no
treatment at all. 40
Many contemporary observers of the pharmaceutical
industry would like to see regulators address how each drug
compares to alternatives. 41 They keep alive a stance that
the congressional Office of Technology Assessment, now
defunct, 42 brought to official federal attention in 1994 with
its report that found an urgent need to study prescription
drugs in comparative perspective. 43 The FDA has not
embraced this drive. While regarding How safe is this drug?
and How effective is this drug? as questions at the center of
its mandate, until recently the agency has been leery of
regulating comparative effectiveness--or what regulators
and observers more commonly (especially when taking the
position that the subject is out of regulatory bounds) call
"comparative efficacy" or "relative efficacy." 44
Avoiding comparative effectiveness seems at first blush
to have support in the 1962 amendments that introduced
effectiveness to the Food Drug Cosmetic Act. The
40. See Format for Formulary Submissions, supra note 15 (offering to
formulary writers an understanding of how to judge the value a new drug).
41. See ANGELL, supra note 10 (arguing that no reform idea is more
important). See also Robert Pear, Congress Weighs Drug Comparison, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 24, 2003, at 18 ("How does Lipitor stack up against Zocor for
lowering cholesterol? How does Prilosec compare with Protonix for ulcers and
heartburn? How do the long-term effects of Vioxx and Celebrex compare with
those of older drugs for arthritis, like Motrin and Naprosyn?").
42. On its decline and fall, see PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA'S
HEALTH: THE FDA, BUSINESS, AND ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION 212-13
(2003); Anita Bernstein, Engendered by Technologies, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1, 107
(2001).
43. See David Brown, Patient Databases Don't Show Which Treatment
Works Best, Study Finds, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1994, at A8. The Office of
Technology Assessment also explored the question of why such studies are so
seldom done. One major impediment is lack of prestige: funders like to pay for
small studies of new treatments, not large, unglamorous tracking of
longstanding ones. Id.
44. The most accurate term would be "comparative efficacy"-that is, an
assessment of clinical improvement. Because this term and "relative efficacy"
are uncommon in the drug policy literature, we go along with the prevalent
"comparative effectiveness."
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amendment's chief sponsor, Senator Estes Kefauver,
contributed a morsel of legislative history that some have
interpreted as an obstacle to comparison. "I want to make
clear," Kefauver declared in 1961, that "it was only
intended that the manufacturer satisfy the Food and Drug
Administration that it [a drug] was efficacious for the use
intended and claimed by the manufacturer, not trying to
say it is better than some other drug or poorer than some
other drug."45
Although this sentence perhaps did not "make clear"
very much, one commentator offers a succinct translation:
"Congress did not intend for sponsors to prove a new drug
has greater relative efficacy than its competitors" in order
to win approval. 46 Under this plausible construction,
regulators may seek to extract and disseminate information
about drug comparisons; 47  the only constraint that
Kefauver's remark imposes is these regulators may not
withhold approval of a safe and effective drug merely
because the drug does not outperform competitors in its
class. Senator Kefauver was speaking about yes/no
decisions; his statement does not keep comparative-
effectiveness review out of the statutory mandate. 48 Further
support for this conclusion comes from an effort that
Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich led
in the mid-1990s: Gingrich sponsored draft legislation that
45. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 417 (1961). Jerry Avorn has expressed his
belief that the FDA has limited powers with respect to regulating comparative
efficacy. See AVORN, supra note 10, at 380-81; Telephone Interview with Jerry
Avorn, Professor of Medicine, Harvard Medical School, and Chief of the Division
of Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacoeconomics, Brigham and Women's
Hospital (Feb. 11, 2004).
46. Kulynych, supra note 3, at 133.
47. It may not be necessary to parse the Kefauver remark: comments that
members of Congress make about a statute probably do not constrain the
actions of an agency. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the
Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 365 (1994) (discussing this
understanding, and noting that forceful advocacy from Justice Scalia has made
it stronger).
48. See generally Joint Hearing of the International Trade Subcomm. and
the Health Care Subcomm. of the S. Finance Comm., 108th Cong. (2004)
(presenting testimony from FDA representative William K. Hubbard that while
cost-effectiveness determinations may lie outside the FDA mandate,
comparative efficacy falls inside it, especially if the FDA would not undertake to
remove or ban a drug that does not outperform its competitors).
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would have forbidden "drug reviewers to compare the
effectiveness of two commercial drugs with one another in
determining whether to approve a new one."'49 The defeat of
this effort indicates that the FDA had then, and still has,
authority to promote comparative effectiveness. 50 The best
way to promote comparative effectiveness is through
information.
As with How safe and effective is this drug?, insight into
our question of comparisons to alternatives emerges from
contemporary experience. The plummeting of costly COX-2
inhibitors-Vioxx and Bextra withdrawn, Celebrex alive
but shrouded in gloomy warnings-brought glory onto the
humbler non-steroidal anti-inflammatory trinity: aspirin,
ibuprofen, and naproxen. 51  One study comparing
nabumetone, a name-brand non-steroidal anti-
inflammatory agent, with ibuprofen found a big gap in
pharmacy wholesale costs: a month's supply of the
nabumetone cost $58.68, compared to $8.64 for ibuprofen. 52
A more notorious contemporary story about alternatives
features Synthroid, the brand-name version of
levothyroxine. When researchers at the University of
California at San Francisco concluded a study in 1990
finding this name-brand hormone no better than three
generics, the manufacturer of Synthroid, which had paid for
the study, responded first by discrediting the early findings
and then by pressuring the researchers to withdraw their
paper from the Journal of the American Medical
Association, where it had been scheduled for publication in
49. HILTS, supra note 42, at 319. This sentence appears to use effectiveness
as roughly synonymous with efficacy.
50. See id. at 325-33 (describing the coalition politics that ended Gingrich's
plans to hobble the FDA).
51. See FDA Doctor Questions Need for Any Drugs from the COX-2 Class,
BIOWORLD TODAY, Feb. 18, 2005.
52. Cited in Larry D. Sasich & Sidney M. Wolfe, HRG Comments on Direct-
to-Consumer Prescription Drug Promotion, PUBLIC CITIZEN (August 12, 1996),
available at http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=6596. The
prices were for minimum recommended doses. Id. Physician Sidney Wolfe and
pharmacist Larry Sasich responded to these findings by issuing a general
prescription for more information. "It is difficult to imagine a set of
circumstances in which a prescription drug consumer given accurate complete
comparative information would accept the unknown risk of toxicity and the
higher cost of nabumetone as a treatment over ibuprofen or naproxen." Id.
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1995. Their findings of bioequivalence-that Synthroid
accomplishes nothing that its generic competitors cannot
do-were not published until 1997, costing the public an
estimated $800 million in the Synthroid premium, or money
for nothing, over the two years of suppression.53 Other
comparative studies could tell consumers more about the
utility of alternative treatments.
C. What Is It Like to Consume This Drug?
Next to the lofty mandate of "safe and effective," this
final question may seem a little shallow. Amateurs answer
it with reference to their feelings, not the professional
expertise for which the FDA achieved fame and high public
approval. "Safe" and "effective," both gradable rather than
absolute adjectives, 54 were never so pure as a dismisser of
this question might presume, however, and when
regulatory policy balances these against each other in
making determinations about approval, 55 it shows that even
these domains of science contain space for flexibility.
Direct-to-consumer advertising of our well-worn
example, Vioxx, shows how closely semi-subjective
experiences fit inside the traditional domain of regulation.
In 2002, three years before the drug was withdrawn, the
FDA gave Merck permission to advertise Vioxx as "gentler
53. See Drummond Rennie, Thyroid Storm, 277 J. AM. MED. Assoc. 1238
(1997).
54. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. One prominent drug-law
scholar has written that regulators engaged in this balance even before the
1962 amendments that introduced effectiveness as a criterion for approval:
Although FDA's authority [in 1938-1962] over concededly 'new' drugs
was formally limited to confirming their safety, agency reviewers often
felt obliged to consider their therapeutic effectiveness as well. Drugs
were, after all, biologically active agents and thus inherently posed
some risk. Whether a particular drug could be considered 'safe,'
therefore, depended on whether it offered medical benefits that
outweighed the risk. Increasingly, FDA found itself engaged in an
informal form of risk-benefit assessment for new drugs prior to
marketing.
Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical
Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1764 (1996) (citation omitted).
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to the stomach." 56 This soundbite recites in simple English
the observed phenomenon that Vioxx and other COX-2
inhibitors have a relatively low association with
endoscopically demonstrable gastric ulceration. But
patients might have wanted to know that COX-2 inhibitors
were never shown to have produced a more pleasant
subjective experience with regard to gastrointestinal
symptoms 57-a gloss on "gentler to the stomach" that lay
persons might well have put on Merck's claim. More
information in response to What is it like to consume this
drug? would have clarified the topic that a manufacturer
broached, with FDA approval, but did not resolve.
The question of What is it like to consume this drug? is
a crucial component of the safety-and-effectiveness
regulatory mission. The subjective experience of
consumption affects whether patients will follow a drug
regimen, thus playing a role in effectiveness. It is
impossible to study the clinical impact of any treatment for
a chronic condition without studying compliance.58
Compliance issues are at the heart of, among other treated
conditions, current (pre-vaccine) HIV therapy, which can
require patients to take many pills each day under
strenuous and varying circumstances. Keeping track of
patients' subjective responses to medication is so central to
studying effectiveness that researchers use a patented
device called the "medication event monitoring system" to
chart compliance by recording the date and time that a pill
container is opened.
Noncompliant patients are not the only constituency
that has something pertinent to say about the subjective
experience of taking a drug. Anecdotes about futility can
round out the safety-and-effectiveness picture with details
that otherwise might fail to draw the attention of
formulary-writers and other repeat-player choosers of
56. National Briefs, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 12, 2002, at A21.
57. See NORTIN M. HADLER, OCCUPATIONAL MUSCULOSKELETAL DISORDERS 74
(3d ed. 2005).
58. The problem has concerned public health researchers for many years.
See Jim Shamp, Prescription Dereliction, HERALD-SUN, May 20, 2001, at G2
(noting that a 1979 study "identified more than 200 variables that interfered
with compliance.").
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which drugs to buy.59 Managed-care organizations do have
incentives to care about safety and effectiveness, but so did
the physician circa 1962 (reputation, professional pride,
bonds with patients), and today this physician perspective
in isolation is regarded as inadequate to monitor these
criteria without more input.60 Moreover, many clinical
aspects of drug quality do not reach the attention of
decision-making personnel who work for managed-care
organizations. 61 When patients answer our question with
something like, "Terrible, it stinks," then, public-health
consequences follow.
59. Three years ago, Paul Fanning, a friend and co-author of one of us
(Anita), was receiving chemotherapy for his lung cancer. When the treatment
made him severely nauseated, his insurer supplied him with an anti-nausea
prescription drug. Paul agreed to more chemotherapy knowing his nausea could
be controlled, but after the second round began, he learned that the insurer had
withdrawn coverage of the effective drug. He received an ineffective drug
instead, and the insurer ignored his protests about ineffectiveness. Paul refused
further chemotherapy and all other treatments, and died about five months
later. He hated to complain; we would not have known of his experience had
Anita not mentioned this project-in-progress. Paul told the story after she
relayed to him the contention that managed-cared organizations have sufficient
incentives to enforce effectiveness. See, e.g., Note, FDA Reform and the
European Medicines Evaluation Agency, 108 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2019-23 (1995)
(arguing that the FDA should regard EMEA approval as sufficient to satisfy the
statutory requirement of "substantial evidence" of drug effectiveness); Henry I.
Miller, Vaccine Development a Casualty of Flawed Public Policy, HOOVER INST.
WKLY. ESSAYS, May 5, 2003, available at http://www.hoover.org/
pubaffairs/dailyreport/archive/2848681.html (making a similar argument for
vaccine approval). Paul pointed out that if his drug had promised to cure him of
cancer, or put him back to work paying premiums, then the managed-care
organization would indeed have cared to monitor its performance. For palliative
treatment of the terminally ill, however-and for other therapies-effectiveness
will not appear on a managed-care balance sheet.
60. See Barbara Marticelli McGarey, Comment, Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers and Consumer-Directed Information-Enhancing the Safety of
Prescription Drug Use, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 117, 122 (1984) (arguing that "if
prescription drugs are to be used safely and effectively, the consumer must be
able to assist the prescribing physician in weighing the risks and benefits of
drug therapy, and in monitoring that course of therapy.").
61. Reports of unsafety and ineffectiveness have to travel some distance
from affected patients, through a chain of individuals. For instance, imagine a
patient harmed or not helped by a particular drug. She might be married to an
insured employee. The patient might convey her story to her husband the
employee--or she might not. The husband might talk to a human-resources
manager-or he might not. The manager might talk to his supervisor. The
administrator in charge of insurance contracts might make a decision-if she
felt motivated to overcome inertia.
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Understanding what it is like to take a drug would
benefit all three of the "new consumers" highlighted in this
Essay. Patients' bodies are on the line. Prescribing
physicians who must choose among treatments would want
data relating to the complaints, compliance, abandonment,
and adaptations that patients express and reveal after they
start new drug regimens. Formulary writers could take
user satisfaction into account in choosing which drugs to
buy. Third-party payors would make better actuarial
projections about responses to drugs when they know how
patients perceive these treatments. Even manufacturers
would gain from what would be in effect disinterested and
well-designed supplementary market research about the
products they and their competitors sell.
Like comparative effectiveness, the study of lay
perceptions of drugs once lay outside what the FDA saw as
its ambit, and more recently has come closer to its agenda.
In 2004, a former associate commissioner of external
relations at the FDA challenged the agency's Division of
Drug Marketing, Advertising, and Communications to
make determinations about the promotional material it
reviews-for "fair balance," "adequate provision," and the
like-using social science rather than coming to ad hoc,
unsubstantiated conclusions. 62  The "FDA had been
planning to improve social science at the agency for at least
a year," its newsletter reported, somewhat sheepishly, in a
December 2004 announcement about the agency's plans to
study how lay consumers perceive health claims about foods
and dietary supplements. 63  Just as perceptions of
promotional material are part of the "fair balance" mix,
patient experiences with drugs belong within judgments of
their safety and effectiveness. Gathering answers to the
question of "What is it like to consume this drug?" fits
within the FDA's informal motto of "science rules,"64 not
only because subjective experiences affect results, but
because these data can be reliably measured.
62. Peter Pitts, Put More Science in Social Science, PHARMACEUTICAL
EXECUTIVE, Sept. 1, 2004, at 186.
63. FDA Plans to Study Consumer Responses to Health Claims, FDA WEEK,
Dec. 17, 2004. With a touch of interagency rivalry, the announcement
mentioned that the FDA sought "solid approaches for measuring consumer
perception like the science that the Federal Trade Commission uses."
64. Pitts, supra note 62.
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II. THE PRODUCTION OF INFORMATION: ANSWERS
Here we link "the information prescription" with
answers to the questions that consumers ask before
choosing whether to buy products in this market.
A. "How Safe and Effective Is This Drug?" Answers
We endorse three recommendations-first,
"pharmacovigilance;" second, the public registration of drug
trials; and third, improved definitions of statutory terms-
that appear in the literature as solutions to a range of
policy problems. Here we note the centrality of information
to all three, and examine them in terms of what they reveal
to consumers and regulators.
1. Codifying Pharmacovigilance. "Pharmacovigilance,"
a venerable concern about adverse responses to
treatment, 65 may be extended to describe the ongoing
investigation into prescription drugs in use that ought to
follow regulatory approval. Two academic physicians
elaborated on this concept following the saga of Vioxx,
launched in 1999 as a treatment for arthritis and a star
drug until findings emerged linking it to heart attacks and
other vascular complications. 66 Merck withdrew Vioxx from
the market in September 2004. Unprompted by either
regulation or personal-injury litigation, Merck had found
the risks on its own, in a study called APPROVe.
"Merck has always believed that prospective,
randomized, controlled clinical trials are the best way to
evaluate the safety of medicines," said Peter S. Kim, Ph.D.,
the president of Merck Research Laboratories, in a much-
reported quote. "APPROVe is precisely this type of study-
and it has provided us with new data on the cardiovascular
profile of VIOXX." 67 What Dr. Kim did not add was that
Merck did not sponsor the study to monitor the safety of its
65. See generally Philip Routledge, 150 Years of Pharmacovigilance, 351
LANCET 1200 (1998) (reporting the formation of a commission to monitor
anesthesia-related deaths following an adverse incident in 1848).
66. See Simon R.J. Maxwell & David J. Webb, COX-2 Selective Inhibitors-
Important Lessons Learned, 365 LANCET 449, 450 (2005).
67. Quoted in Merck Withdraws Vioxx Based on 3-Year Data from APPROVe
Clinical Trial, Sci. LETTER, Oct. 26, 2004 [hereinafter Merck Withdraws].
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extremely successful product. 68 The name APPROVe did not
refer to ongoing duties to retain FDA approval but to
"adenomatous polyp prevention on Vioxx": Merck hoped to
determine that Vioxx prevented the recurrence of colorectal
polyps in patients with a history of colorectal adenomas.69
Absent this motive to expand business, Merck would have
left well enough alone, and foregone the study that proved
to be the undoing of its bestseller. 70
The APPROVe study provides an unintentionally aptly
named illustration of the pharmacovigilance that ought to
ensue after approval. That Vioxx causes significant
cardiovascular risks was not shocking, in hindsight. Vioxx
is a COX-2 inhibitor. Prostacyclin inhibits platelet
aggregation and vasoconstriction; COX-2 inhibitors
decrease prostacyclin. Therefore Vioxx, as a COX-2
inhibitor, could elevate blood pressure and promote
thrombosis. Years before the dangers of Vioxx came to light,
studies had noted this COX-2 inhibitor risk.71
This mechanistic assessment did not necessarily make
any COX-2 inhibitor a bad drug, ex ante. Clinical experience
could yield a contrary result. 72 But, in hindsight, it shows
the need for regulators to mandate pharmacovigilance as a
condition for continued approval. Under a
pharmacovigilance model, approval ceases to be a static
phenomenon, and undergoes continuous reexamination.
Manufacturers have a duty to seek and report additional
data where articulable standards declare that it is needed.
A pharmacovigilance rule in the Code of Federal
Regulations could begin as follows: "Where the safety
studies on which a drug's approval is based are suggestive
68. Sales were $2.5 billion in 2003, the drug's last full year of life on the
market. Julie Schmit & Kevin McCoy, FDA Panel Supports Return of Vioxx,
USA TODAY, Feb. 21, 2005, at B1.
69. Merck Withdraws, supra note 67.
70. Merck lost $25 billion in market capitalization following its withdrawal
announcement, and then lost another $15 billion before its stock price hit
bottom in November 2004. Steven Milloy, Merck's Costly Withdrawal, N.Y. SUN,
Feb. 24, 2005, available at http://www.csrwatch.com/merck_withdrawal.htm.
71. G.A. FitzGerald et al., COX-2 Inhibitors and the Cardiovascular System,
19 (Suppl. 25) CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL RHEUMATOLOGY S-31, S-31 (2001).
72. Consider the inverse: every promising cancer therapy began with an
appealing mechanistic argument; and yet cancer is still with us.
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of clinically significant adverse alternative results, the FDA
may mandate additional post-marketing studies as a
condition of approval." Statistical techniques aid the
inquiry.73 The principle of pharmacovigilance identifies
opportunities to infer the possibility of danger; regulations
should provide expressly for pharmacovigilance-based
requirements of more study.
The Code contains a model for this rule: food additives
of questionable safety can receive provisional approval,
attached to conditions that mandate the withdrawal of
approval when a manufacturer fails to maintain vigilant
safety research or to report what its ongoing studies say. 74
Consistent with the utility theme that pervades this Essay,
the rule could elaborate that these post-marketing studies
should be ordered with attention to the costs of being
wrong, taking into account the likely effectiveness of the
drug. Also borrowing from existing regulation, the
pharmacovigilance rule could provide in its concluding
sentence that "these postmarketing studies shall be
73. For example, a low incidence level of adverse effects would suggest that
a drug is safe; a high incidence level suggests it is dangerous. But because
chance rather than an agent can cause the adverse effect, the statistical
convention of p = 0.5 provides that when the probability about being wrong on
causation is less than five percent, the scientific community will accept a
linkage as statistically significant. Biostatisticians at the FDA use more
advanced techniques than this "p value" convention, but they too have to deal
with findings of exposure coupled with adverse effects that raise questions
about causation. For a particular drug, p = 0.06 might not be not high enough to
say dangerous, but it is also too high to ignore.
74. [W]hen new information raises a substantial question about the
safety or functionality of the substance but there is a reasonable
certainty that the substance is not harmful and that no harm to the
public health will result from the continued use of the substance for
a limited period of time while the question raised is being resolved
by further study,
21 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2004), the Code provides that the FDA can issue a limited
approval of this food additive, conditioned on further study and twice-annual
reports by the manufacturer:
If the progress report is inadequate or if the Commissioner concludes
that the studies are not being pursued promptly and diligently or if
interim results indicate a reasonable likelihood that a health hazard
exists, an order will promptly be published in the Federal Register
revoking the interim food additive regulation effective upon
publication.
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reported annually until FDA notifies the applicant, in
writing, that the agency concurs with the applicant's
determination that the study commitment has been fulfilled
or that the study is either no longer feasible or would no
longer provide useful information."75
So understood, pharmacoviligance extends current
regulations, which now dichotomize too sharply between
pre- and post-approval surveillance. The present Part 314
of Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations, called
"Applications," is divided into thirteen subsections, of which
only two now address post-approval duties. In contrast to
the stringent demands before approval, the FDA post-
approval limits manufacturers' duties mainly to the
reporting of adverse incidence and collection of relatively
minor miscellaneous danger. 76  Only for exceptional
categories-accelerated approval or pediatric applications-
do the regulations provide for FDA-mandated
"postmarketing study commitments." 77 Pharmacoviligance
would increase these commitments.
Findings on effectiveness as well as safety can emerge
from pharmacovigilance. Physicians Thomas G. Roberts, Jr.
and Bruce A. Chabner have proposed a new rule that uses
the tradeoff approach described above. 78 Roberts and
Chabner would extend "fast track" drug approval to
encourage improvement in certain types of drugs, especially
anticancer agents.79 They endorse new rules to authorize
preliminary approval if a drug achieved encouraging results
in early efficacy trials, but only if at the time of its new-
drug application it had "initiated studies to identify
subgroups of patients who are likely to have responses. 80
Present regulatory conditions, Roberts and Chabner
explain, give manufacturers no incentive to continue their
75. Id.
76. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.80, 314.81 (2004).
77. 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(2)(vii) (2004).
78. See Thomas G. Roberts, Jr. & Bruce A. Chabner, Beyond Fast Track for
Drug Approvals, 351 NEw ENG. J. MED. 501, 501-02 (2004).
79. "Fast track" refers to the FDA's obligation to rush new drugs to market
when they fulfill an "unmet medical need." Food and Drug Modernization Act of
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 112(a)(1), 111 Stat. 2296, 2309, 21 U.S.C. § 356(a)
(1) (2000).
80. Roberts & Chabner, supra note 78, at 504.
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research to determine which classes of patients are likely to
benefit from their drug once it has been approved. They
suggest "that the FDA require that a minimal percentage of
drug sales," perhaps five percent, "be allocated either to
studies focused on identifying subgroups of patients who
are likely to have responses or to the NIH for its
sponsorship of related research."' Patients who take cancer
drugs would find regulatory innovation of this kind
especially welcome, as these drugs have an exceptionally
weak track record.8 2 Another field of post-marketing study
that manufacturers could undertake is what off-label
clinical experience with their drugs teaches-an enormous
base of potential information, now gathered fitfully and in
the form of anecdotes. 8 3
Pharmacovigilance, as Roberts and Chabner present it,
reminds policymakers that just as the conclusion of "safe"
cannot be static, so too must judgments of effectiveness be
forced to stand up over time. Initial studies that show
effectiveness to the satisfaction of regulators become the
basis of approvals-and then subsequent studies often
refute or question these older findings of effects. One review
returned to all original clinical studies published in three
major medical journals between 1990 and 2003 that were
cited more than one thousand times to see how their
conclusions fared later.8 4  The reviewer, physician-
epidemiologist John Ionnidis, found that forty-five out of
forty-nine highly cited studies had reported that a
particular intervention was effective. Subsequent research
contradicted seven of these findings of effectiveness,
lonnidis reported; for another seven, these follow-ups found
81. Id.
82. Cf. Merrill Goozner, Prescription for Reform, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2003,
at A23.
83. See Mitchell Oates, Note, Facilitating Informed Medical Treatment
Through Production and Disclosure of Research into Off-Label Uses of
Pharmaceuticals, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272 (2005). The author proposes that drug
manufacturers be compensated for doing this research and sharing it with the
public, but admits to some difficulty in identifying a suitable means of
compensation. Id. at 1305-06 (noting that the traditional way to reward
pharmaceutical companies, "market exclusivity," is extremely costly to the
public). On the valuable information generated by off-label experimentation, see
Klein & Tabarrok, Who Certifies, supra note 13.
84. John P. A. Ioannidis, Contradicted and Initially Stronger Effects in
Highly Cited Research, 294 JAMA 218 (2005).
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that the intervention had a significantly weaker effect than
what the early study had announced.8 5
To some critics, demand for more tests may seem like
yet another costly, innovation-stifling regulatory burden.
The example of Vioxx may again be instructive. Merck
undertook the study that ultimately showed an increased
rate of cardiovascular events-its APPROVe trial-to
broaden the market for Vioxx by seeking evidence to
support a claim that the drug prevented familial
adenomatous polyposis, or FAP. Casual observation of the
rough size of this potential secondary market helps to
estimate the magnitude of additional studies as a new
regulatory onus. While a manufacturer might prefer to
account for costs associated with the original studies as
costs of the post-marketing studies, a fairer method is to
consider only the marginal costs. These costs can be
inferred by studying the marginal increases to the market;
we assume that Merck would not invest x+y to augment
sales revenues by x. FAP is an extremely rare condition,
affecting approximately 10,000 people in the United
States.8 6 Perhaps Merck had high hopes beyond FAP. It
might have pursued this indication to gain insights into the
basic biology of polyp formation to help develop other
products. But this payoff would come long in the future, if
at all. Rule-writers may infer that this manufacturer did
not find the cost of its study-a model for the
pharmacoviligance we recommend-ruinous or excessive.8 7
Consider Vioxx again by way of summarizing what
pharmacovigilance has to offer. A review panel might have
85. Id. at 220.
86. Stanford Comprehensive Cancer Center, Familial Adenomatous
Polyposis, http://cancer.stanford.edu/gastrocolo/familial.html (last visited Sept.
5, 2005).
87. Outside experts could join the pharmacovigilance project at relatively
little cost, should the FDA lack the capacity for complete review of all proposed
drugs. Another administrative unit within Health and Human Services, the
Center for Scientific Review, could comment on the possibility of adverse
alternative results and direct particular study. The Center now uses more than
11,000 independent scientists to review proposals for the National Institutes of
Health, and could easily extend its expertise to consultation about
pharmacovigilance at the time of application. See generally Center for Scientific
Review, Welcome to CSR, Jan. 21, 2006, http://cms.csr.nih.gov/AboutCSP
Welcome+to+CSR (last visited Sept. 2, 2006) (noting that the Center conducts
most of its reviews for the NIH, but supports other federal agencies as well).
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noted the issue of prostacyclin inhibition as a concern about
Vioxx and recommended a study. Depending on the severity
of the risk as researchers would quantify it-that is, of the
likelihood of it being clinically validated, as well as its
consequences-the FDA could insist on postmarketing
studies on which continued approval would be contingent.
Review panels would work best relatively sheltered from
media and political scrutiny, and would preferably be
smaller than the FDA's current "problem review" panels. 88
The next Vioxx awaits this regulatory interception.
2. Old Wine in a New Bottle: Public Registration of
Drug Trials. Reformers have long called for drug trials to be
made public before sponsors know what the studies will
say.8 9 At present, pharmaceutical companies that sponsor
clinical trials are free to release selectively only a portion of
what they learn, unless the treatments they study involve
life-threatening conditions.90 About half of the one million
clinical trials that took place in the last fifty years yielded
no study results to the public. 91 Frustrated by what they
called the challenge of trying to "evaluate what's not there,"
editors of twelve prominent medical journals united in 2004
around a new stance: they would not publish the outcomes
of clinical trials unless the trials had been registered in
advance in a public database. 92
One notorious illustration of the problem involves the
antidepressant Paxil and manufacturer, GlaxoSmithKline.
When a GlaxoSmithKline-funded study found Paxil to be
effective for adolescent depression, the company permitted
researchers to publish these findings in the American
88. One Vioxx panel had more than thirty members. Merck's Vioxx May Be
Sold Again, FDA Advisors Rule (Update 2), BLOOMBERG.COM (Feb. 18, 2005),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000087&sid=aM29b_4WufM8 (last
visited Feb. 23, 2006).
89. See Should There Be Mandatory Registration of Drug and Device Trials
to Lessen Selective Reporting of Results?, 19 THE BACK LETTER 112, 112 (2004)
[hereinafter Mandatory Registration] (noting that this suggestion is more than
thirty years old).
90. Rita Rubin, Drugmakers to Voluntarily Post Info Online About Clinical
Trials, USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 2005, at B7.
91. See Mandatory Registration, supra note 89, at 112.
92. Editorial, Register All Clinical Drug Trials, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 4,
2004, at A8.
596 [Vol. 54
INFORMATION PRESCRIPTION
Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry. When another
GlaxoSmithKline-sponsored trial raised concerns about
children having suicidal thoughts while on Paxil, however,
the company kept this finding from the public, declining to
submit it for publication. 93 Questions about the legality of
this suppression remain unresolved because
GlaxoSmithKline settled a fraud action brought by New
York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, paying $2.5 million
and agreeing to publish data on all "relevant studies" of
Paxil.94  Embarrassed by the prosecution and tacit
admission of wrongdoing by one of its largest members, the
Pharmaceuticals Research and Manufacturers of America,
the industry trade organization, announced in early 2005
that member-manufacturers would soon start complying
with a voluntary mandate to post information about their
ongoing clinical trials. 95
This concession fell short of a new federal law that
would compel manufacturers to register all their
"significant clinical trials" in a public database that would
also publish results when the studies ended, as a New York
Times editorial demanded. 96 Members of Congress have
been introducing legislation along these lines in recent
years, thus far with little hope of enactment. 97 A federal
database that could post the trials, ClinicalTrials.gov,
already exists; bills pending in Congress vary in their
particulars, but all would require drug manufacturers to
describe some large portion of their clinical trials on such a
site before findings come in. This change in regulation
93. David Bjerklie, Drug Testing: Putting Trials on the Record, TIME, July 5,
2004, at 42; see also Daren Fonda & Barbara Kiviat, Curbing the Drug
Marketers, TIME, July 5, 2004, at 40.
94. Michael Gormley, Drug Firm Agrees to Disclose All Data, TORONTO STAR,
Aug. 27, 2004, at F5.
95. See Rubin, supra note 88.
96. Editorial, For Honest Reports of Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2004, at
A14.
97. Drug Industry Announces New Initiative to Post Clinical Information
Online, Kaisernetwork.org (Jan. 07, 2005), http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily_
reports/repindex.cfm?hint=3&DRID=27522 (reporting on bills introduced in
Congress).
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would (again, in principle) bring information to public
light. 98
As with pharmacovigilance, the safety gains of this
reform are obvious and the enhancements to effectiveness
more hidden. Paxil-like findings about danger come to light,
or at least become much harder to suppress, when a
manufacturer has announced its study in advance. On
effectiveness-the "new bottle" in which we propose to
house this venerable "old wine" proposal-recall that for
most drugs the magnitude of response is small: so small
that effectiveness becomes apparent only after detailed
statistical analysis of the data.99 The great reliance on
statistical analysis, in turn, creates a situation where
missing innocent-looking information-excluding a few
patients, say, for whom the drug did not work-can unseat
the validity of the inferences. In other words, statistical
tests operate on the assumption that the sample analyzed
represents the underlying population. When some data are
omitted, that assumption becomes incorrect.
Drug consumers (for this purpose, the physicians
among them more than patients) who are willing to accept a
chance that they will be fooled by randomness need to know
about all trials conducted. A truly inert compound tested in
a perspective double-blinded randomized trial has a one in
twenty chance of demonstrating statistically significant
results of efficacy: that, indeed, is the definition of the
criterion for statistical significance, p = .05. If a
pharmaceutical company conducted twenty trials of which
only one found a statistically significant result, its
98. At present the industry prefers to encourage postings on its own site,
ClinicalStudyResults.org, which contains only those study results that
manufacturers choose to disclose. See http://www.clinicalstudyresults.org/home
(last visited Feb. 23, 2006). Its trade organization, the Pharmaceutical Research
and Manufacturers of America, has defended its decision to limit the data that
this site will reveal. Id. (follow "Clinical Study FAQs" hyperlink).
99. A notorious expression of how little actual response drugs deemed
"effective" will cause came in 2003, when a senior executive of
GlaxoSmithKline, the biggest pharmaceuticals company in Britain, announced
that "most prescription medicines do not work on most people who take them."
Steve Connor, Glaxo Chief Our Drugs Do Not Work on Most Patients, INDEP.
(London), Dec. 8, 2003 at 1 (stating that "[i]t is an open secret within the drugs
industry that most of its products are ineffective in most patients .... ).
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compound would not have been shown to be effective. 100
Consumers would be misled if all they knew about were the
positive results.
Unburdened by an obligation to register its trials, a
firm could hire twenty-five academic centers to study a
useless drug, with none of the investigators being made
aware of other studies. One or two of these trials would
show a positive result, simply on the basis of randomness
and the five percent statistical cutoff. These two studies
could be submitted to a journal and published.
Investigators so manipulated would argue with justifiable
sincerity that they discovered something true and
significant.
Even without bad faith of this kind, effectiveness will
always be overstated when only positive trials come to
public light. This overstatement increases because of a well-
studied "publication bias": medical journals
disproportionately report findings of effects. 10 1 Researchers
tend to submit, and editors tend to accept, studies that
show "positive" results. Because negative trials are deemed
less newsworthy, and are more apt to be methodologically
flawed, 102 there are simply fewer of them in press. But
100. For example, some randomized control trials seem to demonstrate the
benefits of homeopathy, see Gregory M. Lamb, Tracking the Idea Smaller Doses
Have Bigger Effects, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 29, 2005, at 16,
notwithstanding the pungent characterization of homeopathy as not only at
odds with the tenets of medicine, but also in conflict with the laws of biology,
chemistry, and physics. See ROBERT L. PARK, VOODOO SCIENCE: THE ROAD FROM
FOOLISHNESS TO FRAUD 64-67 (2000); see also Robin McKie, Sugar Pills That
Cost Too Much, OBSERVER (London), Mar. 10, 2002, at 33 (summarizing
scientific consensus against homeopathy). In other words, there have been
randomized trials that demonstrated what scientists agree is false. That does
not unseat experts' confidence in the randomized control trial; we know, a
priori, that it will be wrong five percent of the time.
101. A clinical trial is six times or more likely to be published if the results
are positive. Kay Dickersin & Yuan-I. Min, Publication Bias: The Problem That
Won't Go Away, 703 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 135 (1993). For a lay summary of
publication bias, see Robert Matthews, Don't Believe Everything You Read in
the Journals, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Jul. 31, 2005, at 35.
102. The scientific method posits that one does not prove a negative but
rather fails to prove a positive. Logicians speak of "negation as failure." See
David Poole, Logical Argumentation, Abduction, and Bayesian Decision Theory:
A Bayesian Approach to Logical Arguments and Its Application to Legal
Evidential Reasoning, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1733, 1738 (2001). A trial might be
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consumers seek a full picture. The best way to ensure that
they are not looking only at a highlight film depicting only
exceptional results is for them to know about every trial. 103
Here we return to the mandatory registration schemes
that the New York Times and members of Congress have
advocated. In our view, the most straightforward way to
foster information is not to demand that all trials be
registered (manufacturers have raised plausible concerns
about excessive exposure of what might constitute trade
secrets) but rather to issue rules saying that if a
manufacturer wishes one day ever to use the information
from the trial as part of a new-drug application, that trial
must have been registered at its outset. The FDA might
treat information from non-registered trials like the
"[i]solated case reports, random experience, and reports
lacking the details which permit scientific evaluation," that
are not considered. 0 4
3. "Would an Alternative Treatment (or No Treatment
at All) Provide More Utility?" Answers. We have seen that
the Food Drug Cosmetic Act permits the FDA to regulate
comparative effectiveness, even though the 1962 legislative
history might, in one reading, bar the agency from
withholding approval of a drug on the ground that another
treatment is better. 10 5 Under any reading of the legislation,
the FDA has the power to foster information about utility.
It should craft rules to answer the question at the heart of
consumer choice whenever an alternative exists: Should I
choose this drug, or another drug instead, or no drug at all?
Our proposals below build on recent developments in
federal drug regulation.
i. Current Law and Policies on Comparative
Effectiveness. Comparative effectiveness is already in play,
wherever federal law and policy acknowledge that some
drugs outperform others and that the public benefits from
measures that elicit information about comparative drug
"negative"-that is, fail to prove a positive assertion-because the positive
assertion is false, or alternatively because it did not enroll enough subjects.
103. Highlight films obscure, for example, the fact that Reggie Jackson
struck out nearly five times for every home run he hit.
104. 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(e) (2004).
105. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
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performance. The first significant federal-government effort
in this area came in 2003, when an $80 million government-
funded study yielded a point about comparisons that could
save consumers billions of dollars: diuretics for high blood
pressure, a drug category that has been entirely off-patent
for decades, slightly outperformed the newer categories, like
calcium channel blockers and ACE inhibitors, in which
several drugs still enjoy patent-monopoly protection 106
The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ) has declared that evaluating the comparative
effectiveness of drugs within categories falls within this
mission. 10 7 The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement
and Modernization Act of 2003108 directs this agency to
conduct new research on "the outcomes, comparative
clinical effectiveness, and appropriateness of healthcare
items and services (including prescription drugs)."'109 This
directive goes beyond the comparative effectiveness of drugs
and opens up all treatments, including nonpharmaceutical
ones, for comparison. So, in late 2005, the AHRQ issued its
first report comparing treatments for a condition (gastric
106. Goozner, supra note 82, at A23.
107. Health plans, hospitals, and Federal, State, and local officials are
wrestling with questions about which drugs are most effective and
how to balance costs with providing the life-saving benefits that
medicines offer. Understanding which medicines work the best for
which patients and at what costs, as well as understanding how to
administer and monitor medication use in a way that ensures
patients' safety, is of critical importance to the health care system.
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Pharmaceutecal Research
Highlights, http://www.ahrq.gov/news/focus/phrmhigh.htm (last visited Sept. 7,
2006).
108. Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-7(a)(1)(A)(i) (2000 & Supp. III 2003). The legislation
authorized $50 million for this research, although to date federal budgets have
not funded it. In 2004, the mandate of the Medicare statute to expand federal-
government studies of comparative effectiveness won a big boost when Mark
McClellan moved from heading the FDA to heading the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid. McClellan had been a longtime advocate of gathering data on
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, and his new post gave him a platform to
continue "leading the charge for more cost-effectiveness information about
prescription drugs" in a way that would keep up the pressure on the FDA to do
the same thing, even with McClellan away from the agency. Jill Wechsler,
Looking for Value, The Push is on to Get FDA to Assess the Cost-Effectiveness of
Drugs, PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE, May 1, 2004, at 38.
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reflux) along with promises for more reports in the
future.110
In other comparison-gathering by the federal
government, the Department of Health and Human
Services has since 1997 sponsored a consumer satisfaction
survey of managed care plans called CAHPS, which is "part
of a nationwide effort to give employers and their workers a
more objective way to buy coverage on the basis of quality,
not just price."'1 1 The survey relies on questionnaires that
private employers and state Medicaid providers distribute
to patient-consumers. These respondents judge their health
plans in response to questions that ask what fellow-patients
would want to know: Do you receive the referrals they
need? Have you felt respected and well-treated? How
helpful is the information you receive? How long must you
wait for service? 112 In principle, if not always in reality,
consumers have access to these government-gathered
rankings, and can use them when choosing among a menu
of plans.113 Although CAHPS does not (yet) survey
consumers' experiences with drugs, it offers a blueprint for
government-funded consumer comparisons of health care.
Comparative-effectiveness policies turn up elsewhere in
government. The United States Department of Defense
measures comparative clinical effects and comparative
effectiveness; so does the state of Oregon for its Medicaid
formulary. While the federal government does not yet
110. See Press Release, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,
Statement of Mark B. McClellan (Dec. 14, 2005), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/
media/press/release.asp?Counter=1739. The AHQR moved into numerous
studies of therapeutic alternatives used to treat the same condition. See Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality, Effective Health Care: Topics in Progress,
http://effectivehealthcare.ahrq.gov/synthesize/activeCER.cfm (reporting on
ongoing studies that compare the effectiveness of treatments for a dozen
common conditions, including arthritis, cancer, and depression).
111. Joe Rojas-Burke, Portland-Area Workers Rate Managed Care, THE
OREGONIAN, Feb. 1, 1999, at Al.
112. See id.
113. Four years ago, a news story criticized the intelligibility of CAHPS data
offered to the public. See Glenn Howatt, Health Plans Do Their Own Diagnosis,
Say They're Doing Well, STAR-TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Nov. 13, 2001, at E2. The
site does indeed seem oriented toward managed care organizations and the
researchers who study them rather than patients. Nevertheless, we did find the
site more accessible when we returned in March 2005, about six months after
our first visit, and somewhat improved further in the following March.
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publish overt comparisons of prescription drugs, its Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality maintains a website
offering treatment guidelines that detail options for
providers. It could readily expand this venue to include
drug comparisons of the kind now offered in Britain's
ministry, the National Institute for Clinical Excellence. 114
ii. Extensions of the Precedents: Toward More
Information. Legislation under consideration in Congress
takes up comparative effectiveness as a regulatory
necessity. One bill would require the National Institutes of
Health and the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality to undertake comparative studies of all drugs "that
account for high expenditures or high use in federally
funded health programs."115 Democrats and Republicans
have signed on. 116 The bill is not novel in that it tracks the
existing Medicare Modernization Act authorization of this
research; rather its contribution is to add money. Its
Congressional sponsor has claimed to offer "trustworthy,
evidence-based information [that] would be easily accessible
(through Internet sites and publications) to private
physicians, clinicians, patients, policymakers and the
general public. '' 17
The next stage of legislation could help finance the
production of such information by taxing drug
manufacturers' research and promotion budgets to finance
comparative study of generic drugs."18 Again, a precedent
114. Amy Tsao, Better Info, Cheaper Drugs?, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Sept. 10,
2003, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/sep2003/tc20030910_
9672_tc078.htm?chan-search. Britain has pioneered in comparative
effectiveness regulation through its single-payer National Health Service. See
Wechsler, supra note 107 (noting that, in Britain, a drug manufacturer must
provide information on comparative cost and value before its drug can be
approved by the national service).
115. Rep. Tom Allen, States Becoming Labs for Health Spending Reform,
THE HILL, Feb. 25, 2004, at 21.
116. See Tsao, supra note 114.
117. Allen, supra note 115.
118. Generics raise complex policy issues. See, e.g., Amy Barrett, Biotech
Drugs: Where Are the Generics?, Bus. WK., May 9, 2005, at 98 (noting that
biotech drugs cannot be replicated with the same degree of identicalness as
other drugs); E. U.'s New Drug Law Toughens Data Exclusivity, Delays Generics,
GENERIC LINE, Jan. 14, 2004 (reporting political controversy of the term). For
present purposes, we accept what one pharmaceuticals lawyer has called a
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informs our next level of rulemaking. Recall the triumph of
diuretics when studied in comparison with newer, more
expensive antihypertensive medications. 119 It is certain that
other generic drugs provide an affirmative answer to Would
an alternative treatment provide greater utility?, but this
answer remains buried because drug manufacturers have
inadequate incentives to seek it, while other researchers-
independent nonprofit centers or FDA advisors-seldom
look. Present R&D to support pharmaceutical innovation
yields only partial information-only the data a
manufacturer needs to determine whether going ahead is
likely to become profitable-and leaves undiscovered the
value of an innovation in context.
The information is missing in two senses: not known,
and not shared when known. In February 2005, the
respected nonprofit Consumers Union began an initiative to
tackle the latter aspect. Consumers Union set out to supply
comparative-effectiveness information via the Internet,
thereby suggesting what further regulation would achieve.
Its website offers comparisons of drugs in categories, offered
as a growing database: when it launched its site, Consumer
Union announced that it intended to cover "most of the
commonly used prescription medicines in the U.S. today" by
early in the next year.120 The site provides "another
perspective on the comparative value of prescription
drugs-a perspective not driven primarily by
pharmaceutical industry advertising and marketing that
emphasizes newer (and more costly) drugs." 121
New rules could readily augment this crucial
information-furnishing function by compelling
manufacturers to learn-rather than closing their eyes to,
and sometimes misstating-how well or poorly their new
products compare to existing pharmaceutical treatments for
a given condition. Because the drug market provides
"simplistic definition" of a generic drug: "one which does not need to
demonstrate that it is safe and effective for its intended use, that demonstration
having been made by another party's product." Alvin J. Lorman, Debate Over
"Generic Biologics" Poses Unique Challenges for Policy Makers, LEGAL
BACKGROUNDER, May 14, 2004, at 1.
119. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
120. CONSUMER REPORTS, Best Buy Drugs, FAQs, http://www.crbest
buydrugs.org/faqs.html#2 (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
121. Id.
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adequate incentives for each manufacturer to study its own
products, regulation should require manufacturers to
compare their proprietary drugs with their nonproprietary
competition, generics. Studies of generic beta-blockers give
these treatments extremely high marks, 122 suggesting that
valuable information would emerge through study of other
treatments for high blood pressure, and still more through
study of generic comparators for all proprietary drugs. New-
drug applications should be revised to require inclusion of
this comparative data. 123
To further answer Would an alternative treatment
provide more utility?, manufacturers of proprietary drugs
might be compelled to pay for advertising to promote
generics. Reduced to a slogan, the rule would be "Promote
Nexium, promote Prilosec too," a reference to the actions of
one manufacturer, AstraZeneca: When its $6 billion
Prilosec, a proton-pump inhibitor used to treat heartburn,
122. See CONSUMER REPORTS, Best Buy Drugs, Treating High Blood Pressure
and Heart Disease-The Beta Blockers, http://www.crbestbuydrugs.org/
drugreportDR betablockers.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
123. For comparable suggestions, see Goozner, supra note 82 (proposing
that the FDA demand "comparative clinical trials for any new drug that a
company wants to bring to the market."); Angell, supra note 10 passim
(proposing that the FDA withhold approval of new drugs that add nothing extra
to the market); supra note 44 and accompanying text (reporting proposal from
Jerry Avorn that the manufacturer of any drug not known to add value to its
predecessors be compelled to disclose this information on its label). Within this
genre, our proposal is modest: at this point, we recommend mandatory
comparisons between a new drug and generics, not between the new drug and
all its competitors; moreover, we do not seek information for the purpose of
withholding approval, but rather to bring forward new knowledge along with a
new drug.
Nevertheless, from the vantage point of manufacturers, this proposal is this
Essay's priciest suggestion, and we make it mindful of its costs. Our premise-
shared by Angell, Avorn, and Goozner-is that any new drug entering a market
that has strong competitors is less likely, ceteris paribus, to add utility than a
drug that sets out to do something novel. If drug manufacturers feel that a
regulatory demand for comparative data discourages them from launching their
latest proton-pump inhibitor or beta blocker, so be it. Diverting their efforts
toward producing and marketing more beneficial drugs would be consistent
with the safety-and-effectiveness mandate. Peter Meredith, The Truth About
the Drug Companies, MotherJones.com, Sept. 7, 2004,
http://www.motherjones.com/news/qa/2004/09/09_401.html (last visited Sept. 9,,
2006) [hereafter Angell Interview] (noting that the drug manufacturing sector is
"free to choose to make whatever drugs it wants to make. If it wants to make
one more me-too drug, it's free to do that instead of making an antibiotic that
may really be needed.").
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approached the end of its patent life, Astra Zeneca created
and marketed a new product, Nexium, which was almost
identical to Prilosec and was no more effective.
Nevertheless, AstraZeneca touted Nexium to both patients
and physicians as better, reaping $3.9 billion in Nexium
sales during 2004.124 "Nexium is a game that is being
played on the people who pay for drugs," said the director of
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services in response
to this ploy, 125 and soon AstraZeneca faced liability for
fraud.126
New regulations compelling the promotion of generics
would not eliminate every game that a me-too drug
manufacturer could play, 127 but would force competition
against cheaper effective drugs on a more level playing
field. Rule-writers can choose among alternative paths to
underwriting the cost of promotion. In one approach that
we favor, the federal government would tax manufacturers'
research budgets to finance research into generic
alternatives, and tax promotion budgets to finance
promotion of what this research finds.128 Independent
124. Richard Sine, Nexium Sales Increase 20% in 2004, NEWS J., Mar. 31,
2005, at 7B. Prilosec went off patent in 2002 and became available over the
counter in 2004. In 2004, Nexium cost more than five times as much as Prilosec.
Alex Berenson, Where Has All the Prilosec Gone?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at
C1.
125. AstraZeneca Frequently Asked Questions, Hagens, Berman, Sobol
Shapiro, LLP, http://www.hagens-berman.com/files/Nexium%20FAQ%20FINAL
%2021098987097439.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2006).
126. The European Commission fined AstraZeneca sixty million euros for
illegally blocking generic competitors and withholding material information
from patent offices, a penalty that observers regarded as low. AstraZeneca to
Appeal 60-Million-Euro EU Fine; Analysts Shrug Off Impact, AFX INT'L FOCUS,
June 15, 2005. In late 2004, consumer plaintiffs, led by the AFL-CIO and
senior-citizen-based nonprofits, brought an action in Los Angeles court against
AstraZeneca, alleging that its promotion of Nexium violated California
deceptive-practices law. Steve Niles, New Direction for DTC, MED AD NEWS,
Feb. 1, 2005, at 4.
127. For example, a shortage of Prisolec on store shelves in 2005 provoked
accusations that AstraZeneca, manufacturer of both, was withholding Prisolec
so that patients would buy its expensive replacement. See Berenson, supra note
124, at C1.
128. Here we deflect the difficult question of what constitutes the promotion
budget. In an interview, industry critic Marcia Angell remarked on the fine line
between studies and marketing:
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nonprofits like the Oregon Health and Science University
could oversee the comparative research; private-sector
advertising agencies could write and place the ads for
generics, following the model of industry-funded advertising
about the dangers of smoking. 129
Assigning a portion of the industry's research and
promotion expenditures to the study and promotion of
generics puts only a modest burden on the private sector,
and does not necessarily entail their financing of their own
doom: While studies showed that generic levothyroxine,
diuretics, and over-the-counter heartburn medication either
equaled their name-brand competitors or outperformed
them, other studies in the future might well find inequality
and inferiority in generic drugs.
B. "What Is It Like to Consume This Drug?" Answers
Drugs differ from one another in how well they fit in
this query. The safety/effectiveness tradeoff discussed above
reappears: What is it like, one might ask rhetorically, to
experience postexposure prophylaxis, a notoriously
unpleasant treatment, after being bitten by a rabid animal?
Answer: It's better than the alternative. 130 Some patients
Well, no one knows for sure what goes into the R&D budget, because
the companies aren't telling. It's been estimated that about a quarter of
it is spent on Phase IV clinical trials, many of which are just excuses to
pay doctors to prescribe the drug. They don't yield any real scientific
information. But no one knows for sure.
Angell Interview, supra note 123. It would be prudent for new regulations to
define promotion conservatively at the onset, perhaps with reference to the gifts
that pharmaceutical employees give physicians.
129. Following a master settlement agreement that large tobacco companies
signed with state governments in 1998, the cigarette industry has been paying
for anti-smoking advertising. The rather sinister-sounding Citizens Commission
to Protect the Truth, an organization funded by the master settlement to ensure
that this advertising continues, includes as members "all the former U.S.
Secretaries of Health, former U.S. Surgeons General, and former Directors of
the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention-Republican and
Democrat from every Administration over the last forty years." Citizens'
Commission to Protect the Truth, http://www.protectthetruth.org (last visited
Sept. 9, 2006). A blue-ribbon pharmaceutical lineup like this one could
safeguard the promotion of generic drugs, a similarly urgent public health
concern.
130. It is almost impossible to survive rabies without postexposure
prophylaxis. A 15-year-old living in Wisconsin made headlines by recovering
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will not complain about pegylated interferon-alpha plus
ribavirin, its nasty side effects and high cost
notwithstanding, because it is the most effective available
treatment for chronic hepatitis C.131 The question grows
more revealing when patients have options among indicated
prescription-drug treatments or where the consequences of
making a therapeutically suboptimal choice are not dire:
that is, when a drug affects "lifestyle" more than survival.
Under present regulation, the notion of a "lifestyle"
prescription drug lives in twilight: half codified, half denied.
On one hand, the concept fits intuitions about a drug
hierarchy: on top are life-saving medicines; lower down are
drugs that make a person's life more pleasurable by such
effects as growing new hair or increasing sexual
satisfaction; not much higher, to some observers, are
reducing weight, enhancing mood, warding off pregnancy,
and combating infertility. These intuitions are enforced.
Formularies often refuse to pay for, or otherwise will
discourage consumption of, drugs they deem inessential,
cosmetic, or not central to the patient's health. Neither
private insurers nor government insurance programs like
Medicaid and the Veterans Administration are obliged to
pay for every FDA-approved drug: they may discriminate
among these products.
On the other hand, indicators reveal resistance to the
dichotomy. Congress, for instance, used Medicaid
amendments to force state governments to pay for Viagra,
the first erectile dysfunction drug, and a handful of states
have imposed the same mandate on private insurers. 132
Later the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
from the disease (with significant neurological injury), in response to treatment
that She received a month after being bitten by a rabid bat. See Sharon
Worcester, Protocol That Saved Life of a Rabies Patient Requires Further Study,
FAM. PRAC. NEWS, July 15, 2005, at 24.
131. See Liver Gene Profiles Signal Patient Response to Hepatitis C Therapy,
HEALTH & MED. WK., July 4, 2005.
132. See Kim H. Finley, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Viagra? Demand for
"Lifestyle" Drugs Raises Legal and Policy Issues, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 837, 847
(2000). One reason Congress made that call on Medicaid was Medicaid patients
are mostly female, and another large proportion are children. Only ten percent
are adult men. It assumed the mandate would be cheap. Id. at 848.
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determined that Medicare would cover such drugs. 133
Successful demands for birth-control and infertility
coverage suggest a fight against the sense of dismissal that
"lifestyle" conveys. Drugs for nondisabling mental illness,
allergies, and mild osteoarthritis also seem to straddle the
divide.
On balance, the divide between lifestyle and
therapeutic drugs expresses a valid distinction, even though
a few hard cases will land on neither side, and even though
many treatments that appear therapeutic strive to improve
the patient's lifestyle. 134 But what does the line divide? An
answer to this question would shed light on what to do with
the vexing adjective: "lifestyle" offends many, 3 5 but few
133. Laurie Kellman, Medicare to Cover Viagra, Similar Drugs, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Feb. 1, 2005. Not every dose of Viagra falls under "lifestyle:" physicians
occasionally prescribe it to treat heart enlargement caused by high blood
pressure. Id. Covering erectile-dysfunction drugs under Medicare is far costlier
than doing so under Medicaid, a much smaller program means-tested to insure
the poor. See id. (quoting a taxpayer activist: "Asking Uncle Sam to pay for the
romance of 76 million baby boomers will quicken the impending collapse of
Medicare....").
134. Consider, for example, cardiothoracic surgery, an extremely invasive
technology that seems to cut much deeper than the hair and fingernails of
"lifestyle drugs." While such surgery sometimes seeks to rescue a patient from
dying, at least equally as often it seeks to improve quality of life: i.e., ease of
breathing, the ability to climb a flight of steps. Laser surgery to correct
nearsightedness repairs a diagnosed pathology, but also can cater to vanity; one
journalist has suggested that it ranks even lower than "lifestyle." See William
Saletan, The Beam in Your Eye, SLATE, Apr. 18, 2005,
http://www.slate.com/id/2116858 (arguing that surgery to make athletes'
eyesight better than 20/20 is cheating, comparable to using steroids). Similarly,
even though erectile-dysfunction drugs are marketed to enhance lifestyle, they
also bring patients into physicians' offices and thereby generate diagnoses of
untreated diabetes, heart disease, and high blood pressure. See Diane West,
Physicians Favor Drug Ads, Study Says, DRUG STORE NEWS, Mar. 25, 2003.
Furthermore, the notoriously 'lifestyle' Viagra started out life as a treatment for
cardiac disease; its sexual side-effect surprised its manufacturer. Klein &
Tabarrok, Who Certifies, supra note 13, at 60.
135. See, e.g., Susan D. Haas, Researchers Advancing Science of Growing
and Removing Hair, MORNING CALL, Nov. 7, 1999, at A25 (arguing: "Baloney. As
if the bearded lady life style is some kind of choice."). In an interview, James
Love, a staunch critic of the drug industry and director of a consumer group
founded by Ralph Nader, refused to condemn the drug industry for pursuing
lifestyle drugs:
I don't know how judgmental I want to be about these things. If I was a
woman and I had a lot of facial hair, I would want a product. It's not as
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replacement terms broached have been catching on. One
English journalist proposes "behavioral drugs,"'1 36 a term
that omits too many cosmetics like depilatories and
fingernail enhancements, and may also be over-inclusive.
Stepping into this breach, we propose "sapient drugs"
as an alternative term. We invoke a longstanding secondary
meaning of "sapient"-not "wise," that is, but pertaining to
human consciousness and reflection. 137 This dividing line
separates human drugs that might be useful also for other
large mammals in a veterinary practice, on one hand, from
drugs that human beings choose (for themselves or others)
to express or underscore some aspect of the patient's
humanity, on the other. Like most lines between homo
sapiens and other mammals, this one is not perfectly clear,
and, as with the "lifestyle" label, some products will land
near the border. The phrase "sapient drugs" offers
important advantages over "lifestyle drugs," however. It
adverts to nobility rather than frivolousness in the human
species, thereby refraining from gratuitous insult to
patients who choose to consume these substances. At the
same time, it challenges the undefended prestige of equally
"lifestyle"-focused therapies that have escaped this label. 138
It also follows the injunction about first doing no harm:
Managed-care formularies, both private and governmental,
already put what they classify as lifestyle drugs on their
lowest tier, and so a new label that minimizes the old
reference to frivolity would be unlikely to cause their
patients detriment.
New regulations for "sapient drugs" could recognize the
category while understanding that it presents a continuum,
blurred at the edges, rather than an absolute. At the center
of the sapient category would drugs sold primarily by
direct-to-consumer marketing, as well as new drugs likely
high a priority maybe as a product for cancer, but nobody condemns
people who make Nike sneakers because they don't cure cancer.
FRAN HAWTHORNE, INSIDE THE FDA: THE BUSINESS AND POLITICS BEHIND THE
DRUGS WE TAKE AND THE FOOD WE EAT 277-78 (2005).
136. Joe Studwell, Oh, Behave!, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2004, FTmagazine, at
16 (stating "[s]ome argue that the terms 'lifestyle' or 'quality of life' drugs insult
those who suffer from pathological conditions such as depression, schizophrenia,
obesity or compulsive behaviour, so we will use the term 'behavioural drugs."').
137. See 14 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 472-73 (2nd ed. 1989).
138. See supra note 120 (giving cardiac treatments as an example).
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to be so promoted. The group would include prescription
drugs not necessary to sustain life or fend off a future
significant adverse event like a heart attack. The purpose of
codifying the label would not be to withhold third-party
payments but to identify which subset of prescription drugs
call for closer attention to the experiences of patients who
consume them.
We offer two examples of prospective new regulation
that would work with the sapient category to yield
information of value to drug consumers. Because sapience
stands on a continuum rather than an absolute end point,
these new regulations need not be limited to a particular
shortlist of prescription drugs, but their gains would
emerge most sharply for a drug designed to be taken
regularly or frequently, and that patients, physicians, and
entity consumers agree could be lived without.
First, we propose that the FDA track and disclose
prescription refill rates of sapient drugs. Today the
pharmaceutical industry, for its own purposes, monitors
prescription refills in detail. 139 Portions of the data it
gathers are the public's business. The FDA could require
that pharmacies report directly to the agency-and
indirectly to the public-how often a consumer who tries a
lifestyle drug comes back for more. Other consumers would
benefit from knowing about this instance of voting-with-
feet. Some share of refill data should be disclosed: of
particular benefit to consumers would be to know how
many patients, on record as refilling other prescriptions,
chose not to buy more of a particular lifestyle enhancement.
Such a patient has revealed herself to be alive and well
enough to buy more drugs, and yet uninterested in buying
any more of this one.
Second, we would expand existing measurements of
consumer satisfaction by the federal government:
government studies like the CAHPS survey could also ask
about patient experiences with sapient drugs.' 40 Patients'
139. Cutting Edge Information, a consulting firm specializing in
pharmaceuticals, prepared a report in January 2004 using some of this refill
data and offered it on its website at $2,995 per electronic copy. See
http://www.pharmadiseasemanagement.com (last visited Aug. 29, 2006).
140. See supra notes 109-11. In August 2005, the New York Times ran a
series of stories describing patients' encounters with the American health care
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opinions about side effects, value for money spent,
convenience, packaging and labeling, accuracy of
advertising, how fairly the drug is covered by insurance
formularies, and the like would benefit all of our "new
consumers."'' American individuals, especially (but not
limited to) those who are relatively young or affluent, will,
in the near future, grow more comfortable with more of the
commercial rankings that already inform their purchases.
Functioning like the maligned-yet-appreciated response
data now established-think Zagat restaurant ratings,
eBay feedback numbers, Amazon.com reader-scored
reviews-government- supported satisfaction data would
help consumers, especially patients, when they contemplate
buying this optional commodity.
CONCLUSION: IN PRAISE OF HINDSIGHT: THE FDA's MISSION
STATEMENT
The FDA's mission statement challenges regulators:
The FDA is responsible for protecting the public health by
assuring the safety, efficacy, and security of human and veterinary
drugs, biological products, medical devices, our nation's food
supply, cosmetics, and products that emit radiation. The FDA is
also responsible for advancing the public health by helping to
speed innovations that make medicines and foods more effective,
safer, and more affordable, as well as helping the public get the
accurate, science-based information they need to use medicines
and foods to improve their health. 142
American drug regulators, charged with "assuring the
safety, efficacy, and security" of prescription drugs, 143 may
wonder whether they are doing their job well. They know
that drugs inflict injury; does injury connote lack of
safety? 144 Drugs often fail to make patients better off, thus
system. The accounts, most of them reporting distress, ran on the front page
and would land regularly on the "Most E-Mailed Articles" list at nytimes.com,
suggesting a high level of consumer interest in this feedback.
141. See supra Part II.A.
142. See FDA's Mission Statement, http://www.fda.gov/opacom/morechoices/
mission.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2006).
143. Id.
144. See supra note 4 (quoting the famous statement by Paracelsus that all
substances are poisons).
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showing lack of efficacy; they also often fail to live up to the
claims on their label, demonstrating ineffectiveness. In the
United States the track record of drugs on "security" (in the
sense of resistance to tampering or contamination) is very
good, but also flawed. 145 Perfection on each of the fronts
seems not only unachieved but unattainable. What then
does the safe-and-effective mandate mean?
The drug-regulation mission statement mentions three
goals-safety, effectiveness, and information-that function
together to generate the fourth goal, public health. 146 Yet
drug regulation in the United States has proceeded as if the
goals of regulation were separate. The first comprehensive
legislation on drugs, enacted in 1906, addressed "security"
by prohibiting the sale of adulterated or misbranded drugs
and foods. 147 A safety mandate (which covers "security")
came next, in 1938. Effectiveness joined the statutory
mandate last, in 1962. The two criteria always
overlapped, 148 and today they can no longer be seen in
isolation.
As two interdependent variables, safety and
effectiveness give the measure of each other. They come
together to yield utility or value. And so for regulators,
"assuring the safety, efficacy, and security" of drugs means
working to maximize the beneficial effects of drugs, making
them as useful or valuable as they can be.
Changes in the market have caused safety and
effectiveness to merge into one query in the years following
the last major statutory change in 1962, when the Food
Drug Cosmetic Act received its last major changes. Back in
145. The FDA has promulgated rules to deter third parties from tampering
with sealed drug packages. See 21 C.F.R. § 211.132 (2004) (providing that over-
the-counter drugs must be sold with "tamper-evident" packaging). Despite
longstanding FDA enforcement of anti-adulteration regulations, in 1982 one or
more malefactors tampered with several packages of the pain reliever Tylenol,
causing seven known deaths. James A. Henderson, Jr., Product Liability and
the Passage of Time: The Imprisonment of Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 765, 780 n.63 (1983) (describing the immediate aftermath of this
tampering); see also Elsroth v. Johnson & Johnson, 700 F. Supp. 151, 153
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (reporting a tampering-related products liability action).
146. See supra note 140.
147. Pure Food and Drugs Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, §§ 6, 8, 10, 34 Stat. 768,
770-71 (1906), codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 351-52 (2000).
148. See id.
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1962, demand came from only one cohort: the only people
with power to choose prescription drugs were physicians. In
the ensuing years, patients and third-party payors joined
the demand side of this market. These three post-1962
consumers perceive safety and effectiveness as ongoing
issues, in play long after the FDA has made its gatekeeping
decision to approve each drug as safe enough and effective
enough to be sold. They see "safe and effective" in layers.
Their baseline expectation is that a trustworthy agency has
approved the drug as adequate on these two criteria.
At the next layer, they need to know more. For
consumers, safety and effectiveness cannot be achieved
without information. Accordingly, the FDA mission to
"speed innovations ' 149 extends beyond the pharmaceutical
laboratory and into its own rulebooks. Only innovative
regulation of the kind we presented can fulfill the
information mandate of the Food Drug Cosmetic Act.
Information about any prescription drug is unbounded,
and so this Essay sorted what consumers want to know into
categories. A first question asks about safety, the oldest
area of regulatory concern. Consumers ask: How safe is this
drug? Because the FDA's mandate is so famous and
popular, many consumers know that at a point in the past
extensive safety data supported approval, but they also
understand that post-marketing experience alters the data
once supplied in a new-drug application. Neither the Food
Drug Cosmetic Act nor its regulations define safety,
suggesting that the designation is fluid enough to change
after marketing.
Another question: Would an alternative treatment, or
no treatment at all, provide equal or more utility? Although
a determination of effectiveness, unlike safety, rests on
extensive definitional material in the statute, post-
marketing experience also alters the earlier investigational
findings of effectiveness-even more, perhaps, than safety.
All the "new consumers" hope to choose the most valuable
option on the prescription drug menu; not everything
approved as "safe and effective" will be of equal use to
them. Finally: What is it like to consume this drug? In
broad terms, then, our reconception of "safe and effective"
149. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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works with three cohorts of consumers who have recurring
questions.
Having emphasized the ground held in common among
our new consumers, we now conclude with a few words
about differences among the groups as they pertain to our
"information prescription." All the cohorts ask similar
questions. Each takes a particular interest in one or two.
For patients, the fourth question, "What is it like to
consume this drug?" holds particular urgency, whereas
physicians and entities ask it only instrumentally, as a
means to anticipate compliance and therapeutic effect.
Asked to name the uppermost question, a physician will
likely mention safety. From its ancient Hippocratic pledge
to "first, do no harm" through contemporary training about
defensive medicine and the need to report adverse
incidents, this profession worries foremost about the risk of
inadvertently hurting another human being through well-
intentioned medical treatment. An entity will take
particular interest in questions about effectiveness and
comparative effectiveness. More than the other two groups,
entities regard prescription drugs as commodities with
price tags, and they seek to maximize the therapeutic effect
that each dollar will buy.
The groups also diverge with respect to the types of
information they can best use and the harmful effects that
information given to them can cause. The vast category of
"patients"-essentially, all of us--contains a wide range of
sophistication, literacy, ability to pay for desired products,
and attitudes toward information. At one end, some
patients want to know nothing about the drugs they take.
At the other end, some cannot get enough information.
Accordingly, the information menu for patients must be
large and varied. As a starting point we applaud much of
the FDA website, which presents updates about drugs in
divergent levels of medical detail. 150  The danger of
150. See FDA Home Page, http://www.fda.gov (last visited Aug. 29, 2006). It
also can obstruct their care. One oncologist began a newspaper letter by reciting
his credentials and then, after this recitation, lamented that "almost daily, I am
in the position of defending my treatment recommendations against the
cumulative results of several hours of Google-searching by a patient .... [This
response] would be insulting if it were not so poignant and heartfelt." Marc L.
Demers, M.D., Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2005, at A24.
Resolving the social-science debates about information overload-including
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information, for patients, is that they will get too much of it.
Information overload, to the extent it is a real danger (a
question this Essay cannot answer), may cause them
anguish.151
For physicians, our information prescription notes their
training in evidence-based medicine. This focus on data is
now standard in curricula research journals and clinical
practice. 152 Trained to value information-based expertise
over the opinions of expert individuals, physicians can and
should learn promptly what epidemiological techniques
reveal about the effects of particular drugs. The danger of
information for physicians is a variation on the theme of
information overload. 153 Now busier as a group than they
have ever been, physicians lack time to absorb all the
evidence-based lessons available about the drugs they can
prescribe. 154 Like the social-science problem of information
overload, the problem of how to give a doctor enough hours
in her day lies beyond what this Essay can resolve. We note
that our information prescription would have the secondary
effect of reducing the noisy clutter that fills clinical practice
today. Taxing promotion budgets to pay for promoting
generics, for example, could well encourage a manufacturer
to curb its marketing-and physicians are still, direct-to-
consumer advertising notwithstanding, the major targets of
this paid-for noise. 155 The obligation to register drug trials
whether it exists-is beyond the scope of this Essay. We note only the
possibility of danger.
151. For a summary of the dispute in both the law reviews and social
science journals, see Michael S. Jacobs, Toward a Process-Based Approach to
Failure-to-Warn Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 121, 142 n.91 (1992).
152. The term dates back to 1992. Brandi White, Making Evidence-Based
Medicine Doable in Everyday Practice, FAMILY PRACTICE MANAGEMENT (Am.
Acad. of Family Physicians, Leawood, Kan.) Feb. 2004, available at
http://www.aafp.org/fpm/20040200/51maki.html#2. See generally Joseph
Bernstein, Evidence Based Medicine, 12 J. AM. AcAD. ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS
80 (2004) (summarizing developments in research and medical education).
153. See supra notes 149-50.
154. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (proposing that regulators
tax promotion budgets); notes 84-85 and accompanying text (discussing the high
proportion of promotion budgets that go to reach physicians, the rise of direct-
to-consumer marketing notwithstanding). See generally Posting of Katrina
Vanden Heuvel, August's Big Pharma Scandals, http://thenation.com/blogs/
edcut?bid=7&pid=14841 (Aug. 20, 2005) (remarking that "doctors have gotten
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similarly might reduce the number of such studies,
eventually offering physicians leaner and more accurate
data.
Entities, which buy drugs as commodities rather than
to penetrate their own bodies or to fulfill a professional
ethic of cure and care, would find that information will
make purchasing decisions both more health-producing and
more cost-effective. The benefits of sharing prescription-
drug information with these entities have already
emerged. 156 On the danger side, one might worry about
augmenting corporate heartlessness. 157  An entity
determined to get away with delivering as little as possible
to fulfill its health-care contracts might interpret our focus
on "information" as the opposite of compassion, patient
autonomy, humane attitudes toward experimental
treatment, or the possibility of granting discretionary
exceptions to cost-cutting measures. We not only disavow
dinners, vacations and even thousands of dollars in fees from drug companies to
attend "conferences" and "summits," where they are informed of the benefits of
the wonder drug du jour."). These promotions take up physicians' time. See id.
(reporting "In 2002, one cardiologist told the Washington Post that Merck sent a
limo to pick him up, take him to dinner and included a bottle of champagne for
kicks.").
156. Private entities have been both selling and giving away such
information to an enthusiastic consumer base. One nonprofit has presented a
protocol, the Format for Formulary Submissions, to be used by pharmacy
benefit managers. See supra note 15. The Format, which focuses primarily on
scientific data showing efficacy and only secondarily on cost data to determine
which drugs should be approved in managed-care formularies, is posted on the
Internet for anybody to download and use. See id. A nonprofit consulting
business called RxIntelligence has offered "independent, objective information
comparing the costs and effectiveness of pharmaceuticals" to a subscriber base
of employers, biotechnology firms, HMOs, hospitals, prescription benefit
managers, benefit consultants (working with corporate human-resources
departments), as well as pharmaceutical companies that wish to keep an eye on
their competition. See RxIntelligence, http://www.rxintelligence.com (last
visited Sept. 10, 2006); see also http://www.rxintelligence.comfbenefits/
index.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
157. See Avorn, supra note 10, at 368 (identifying two ends "of the
pharmaceutical continuum: manufacturers who tend to see any new patented
product as God's gift to medicine whatever its price" on one side, and "insurance
industry cost containers, who could have an opposite bias against costly new
advances" at the other). Although his remark sounds critical, Avorn seeks to
praise, finding value in the money-saving predilection of third-party payors. See
id. (suggesting that in the United States, many organizations share the tasks of
comparing drug cost and effectiveness, consistent with an American belief that
"our nation's strength has been in its pluralism").
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such a message: we have also shown that more information
can resist it.158
Information to build drug regulation through hindsight
holds promise. It guides interpretation of the Food Drug
Cosmetic Act. 159  It responds to the questions that
consumers ask about safety and effectiveness. 160 It fosters
autonomy, a distinct good independent of public-health
improvement. 161 The vast majority of Americans who now
consume, will consume, or pay for prescription drugs can
obtain from information the enhancements to drug safety,
effectiveness, efficacy, and cost-effectiveness that they
pursue.
158. For example, we identified patients as producers and contributors, not
just consumers, within the information-fostering endeavor. We endorsed
consumerism as an avenue toward attaining more valuable drugs and we urged
the FDA to heed patient-made information, including their records of refilling
or not refilling their prescriptions. In addition, we see information as a tool for
patients to fight unfair managed-care decisions that unreasonably take away
treatment options. Accord Faye Fiore, Los Angeles Times Interview: Henry
Waxman, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1997, at M3 (reporting an agenda among members
of Congress to promote managed-care disclosures-from insurers to patients,
physicians to patients, and insurers to physicians-as a means to improve
public health).
159. See supra notes 4-22.
160. See supra Part II.
161. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical
Critique of (a Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1204
(1997) (emphasizing the valence of autonomy: individuals "do not typically view
as equivalent two states of the world, one produced by their own agency and the
other not.").
